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Supplementary Methods
Here we provide further details on the replications, the estimation of standardized effect
sizes and complementary replicability indicators, the implementation of the prediction
markets and surveys, the comparison of prediction market beliefs, survey beliefs, and
replication outcomes, the comparison of reproducibility indicators to experimental eco-
nomics and the psychological sciences, and additional results and data for the individual
studies and markets. The code used for the estimation of replication power, standardized
effect sizes, all complementary replication indicators, and all results is posted at OSF
(https://osf.io/pfdyw/).
Replications
Inclusion criteria
We replicated 21 experimental studies in the social sciences published between 2010 and
2015 in Nature and Science. We included all studies that fulfilled our inclusion criteria for:
(i) the journal and time period, (ii) the type of experiment, (iii) the subjects included in the
experiment, (iv) the equipment and materials needed to implement the experiment, and
(v) the results reported in the experiment. We did not exclude studies that had already
been subject to a replication, as this could affect the representativity of the included
studies. We define and discuss the five inclusion criteria below.
Journal and time period: We included experimental studies published in Nature and
Science between 2010 and 2015. The reason for focusing on these two journals is that
they are typically considered the two most prestigious general science journals. Articles
published in these journals are considered exciting, innovative, and important, which is
also reflected in their high impact factors.
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Type of Experiment: We included experimental studies using within or between sub-
jects treatment comparisons to estimate a treatment effect. Between and within subjects
treatment effects are both designs to identify causal effects. The between subjects treat-
ment design is the “classical” design used in randomized controlled trials (RCT), where
participants are randomly allocated to two or more treatments and the outcome is com-
pared between treatments. This design is for instance the gold standard in medicine
in comparing different medical treatments. Another commonly used design is a within
subjects treatment comparison where the same participants are exposed to two or more
treatments and the outcome is compared between the treatments. We did not include stud-
ies that compare behaviors across different groups of participants (e.g., men vs. women or
high vs. low income individuals). Such studies describe how behavior differs across groups,
but they do not allow for causal interpretation (unless strong assumptions are made). We
also did not include studies comparing the behavior of a group of individuals with a the-
oretical prediction. Such studies are also commonly referred to as “experiments”, but do
not estimate any treatment effects.
Subjects included in the experiment: We included experiments using students or
other easily accessible adult subject pools. These include online experiments on conve-
nience samples such as experiments using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). This inclusion
criterion implies that field experiments are not included, and the reason for this is that
field experiments are typically substantially more expensive and difficult to conduct. Our
inclusion criteria also imply excluding experiments on children.
Equipment and materials needed to implement the experiment: We included
experiments that can be conducted in a standard lab used for experiments in the social
sciences (an experimental lab in psychology or economics). This implies that we exclude
experiments requiring non-standard equipment, interventions, or materials. This means
that for instance fMRI studies are excluded. Examples of other studies excluded not
meeting this inclusion criteria are the study by Falk and Szech1 using mice and the study
by Gelstein et al.2 using human tears. This inclusion criteria is motivated by feasibility
and funding constraints.
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Results reported in the experiment: We included experiments that test at least one
clear hypothesis with a statistically significant finding (p < 0.05). This implies that we do
not include studies reporting null findings, but we focus on replicating findings reported
as “positive findings”.
All the papers meeting these inclusion criteria were included (n = 21). We did not
exclude studies that had already been subject to a replication, as this could affect the
representativity of the included studies (in one case discussed further below, an ongoing
Registered Replication Report study, along with other reasons, affected which study within
that paper was selected for replication). Many of the included papers reported more than
one tested hypothesis with a significant finding, and more than one study. We therefore
used the following three criteria in descending order to determine which treatment effect
to replicate.
1. Include the first study reporting a significant treatment effect for papers reporting
more than one study.
2. Include the most central and important statistically significant result (as emphasized
in the original study) of this study among all within or between subjects treatment
comparisons. The interpretation of which was the most central and important result
in the selected study was made by us, but the original authors could provide feedback
on this when they commented on the draft of the replication report sent to them
for feedback (see below). Prior to conducting the replications we did not receive
feedback from any of the original authors, that we had selected the “wrong” result.
After conducting the replication and seeing the results the original authors in one
study argued that we had not selected the most central and important result. This
was for the replication of Janssen et al.3, where the original authors ex post argued
that comparing the effect of communication on net earning within subjects was a
more central result of their study (in our replication we replicated the result on the
effect of communication on net earnings between subjects as the between subjects
comparison is a stronger identification of causal effects). In some other cases the
original authors of papers reporting the results of a series of studies argued that the
first study selected for replication did not contain the most important result in their
4
paper; but in these cases the result selected for replication followed directly from
applying criteria 1 above.
3. If more than one equally central result remained, we randomly picked one of the
results for replication. This was the case for three papers4−6.
The first criterion differs from the criteria used in the Replication Project: Psychology
(RPP)7 and the Experimental Economics Replication Project (EERP)8. In those projects
the last study, rather than the first study, was included for studies reporting a series of
studies. To include the last study (or the first study) is an arbitrary rule for selecting
which study to replicate, and there is little a priori reason to believe that replicability
differs depending on the order studies are reported. However, it may be problematic if a
rule is established that replications are always conducted on the last study, as that may
lead researchers to present the study they believe the most likely to replicate, last in the
paper. To counteract such possible strategic incentives we decided to include the first
rather than the last study for papers reporting a series of studies.
We deviated from that criteria for one study: the Rand et al.9 paper. The Rand et al.9
paper included 10 studies. Studies 1–5 were correlational studies not estimating treatment
effects, and studies 6–7 tested the effect of time pressure on contributions to a public good;
study 7 is included in a recently published Registered Replication Report study10 (study
6 is similar to study 7, but conducted on AMT instead of in the lab). Based on criteria 1
above, study 6 would have been selected for replication as it was the first treatment effect
study, but as this study was already subject to a Registered Replication Report study
organized by Perspectives of Psychological Science, we chose not to select this study for
replication (one of the authors of this project was also involved in one of the replications
of the Registered Replication Report). A further reason for not replicating study 6 or 7
in Rand et al.9 is that it has been noted that the reported significant finding was due
to selection bias and analyzing the data appropriately as “intention to treat” did not
yield a significant effect11. The intention to treat result was also the primary focus of
the Registered Replication Report10. The Registered Replication Report found that the
result did not replicate, but this was not known to us when we decided not to replicate
this study. For the above reasons we decided to include study 8 in Rand et al.9, as it was
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the first treatment effect study not subject to an ongoing Registered Replication Report
study and it was not subject to a controversy over the appropriate analysis of the data.
Note also that for some of the other papers our criteria above implied that study 1 was
not replicated, as it did not report any significant treatment effects. This was the case for
Duncan et al.12 in which we included study 1b, Gervais and Norenzayan13 in which we
included study 2, and Wilson et al.14 in which we included study 8.
In our initial screening we selected 22 studies that met the above inclusion criteria. We
contacted the original authors requesting materials and asking for feedback on an initial
version of the replication report for these 22 studies. However, during this process we
discovered that the result selected for replication for one of these studies did not fulfill
our inclusion criteria and this study was excluded. This was the study by Mani et al.15.
Originally we intended to replicate the result that inducing thoughts about financial hard-
ship reduces cognitive function more among poor individuals than rich ones (from study 1
in the paper). This was an interaction effect between a treatment that induced thinking
about a hard versus an easy financial problem, and individual differences in participants’
income (i.e., above or below median household income). But as the income level was not
assigned to households as a randomized treatment, but rather was based on their actual
income, this does not match the definition of a treatment effect; it is instead a comparison
of a treatment effect between different groups (rich and poor participants) and the com-
parison cannot be given a causal interpretation (unless strong assumptions are made). It
is thus not consistent with our criteria for the type of experiment (a between or within
subjects treatment effect) which was only realized after the initial screening. It was also
a borderline case in terms of the subjects included in the experiment criteria (the exper-
iment was conducted at a mall with subjects recruited from the mall). This study was
thus excluded from the replication project prior to starting any data collection and our
final replication sample consisted of 21 studies. If an original study included more be-
tween subjects treatments than the treatments selected for replication, we in general only
included the treatments used for the result selected for replication.
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Replication procedure
Statistical Tests. In the replications, we used the same statistical test as was used in
the original study. For one study16 we deviated from this rule as it turned out that the
exact same test as used in the original study yielded clearly implausible standard errors on
the replication data, stemming from the two-way clustering (on the individual and round
level) of standard errors used in the original paper; we instead modified the test slightly
and used one-way clustering (on the individual level) as the main replication test. This,
however, does not affect the conclusion about whether the study replicates or not. See
the replication report for this study for further details. As we used the same statistical
tests as used in the original studies, we did not test if the data collected in the replications
met the assumptions of the statistical tests used (such as assumptions about normality or
equal variances). Thus, for tests based on normal distributions the data distribution was
assumed to be normal but this was not formally tested. All reported p-values in the paper
and Supplementary Information are based on two-sided tests.
Replication teams. There were five replication teams: a team at CalTech and Wharton
(responsible for four replications); a team at the Center for Open Science and the Uni-
versity of Virginia (responsible for five replications); a team at the Stockholm School of
Economics (responsible for five replications); a team at the National University of Sin-
gapore (responsible for three replications); and a team at the University of Innsbruck
(responsible for four replications). All the online experiments using AMT were replicated
by the same team (the team at the Stockholm School of Economics).
Language. One of the original experiments was conducted in German, one in French
and one in Italian; the remaining ones were conducted in English. The replication of
the original study in German was conducted in German (the team at the University of
Innsbruck), but the replications of the original studies in French and Italian were conducted
in English. Fifteen out of the 18 original experiments in English were replicated in English
and the remaining three studies were replicated in German (the team at the University of
Innsbruck).
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Experimental software. The same software and computer programs as in the original
experiments were used to conduct the replications whenever possible, but for some studies
we needed to program new software to conduct the replications:
• The experiment in Aviezer et al.17 was implemented using the software package E-
Prime. While the original authors were eager to provide us with the original code, the
replication experiments were implemented using a custom-designed software module
using oTree18. However, instructions used in the original experiment were provided
and the final program was approved by the original authors.
• The original authors were unable to retrieve the E-Prime computer program used in
the original experiment by Karpicke & Blunt19. Specifically, in the original study,
the sea otters text was presented on the computer screen, as was the answer box for
the retrieval practice condition. However, all other tasks were completed using pencil
and paper in the original study. For this reason, our replication used hard copies of all
of the original materials used in the original study (including the sea otters text and
the retrieval practice answer box originally run through the E-Prime program). The
original authors agreed that the change from computer to paper responses should
not be a consequential difference for the effect studied in the replication.
• In Kovacs et al.20 the original experiment was carried out in Psyscope X to mea-
sure reaction times, but the original program is no longer available. Therefore we
developed a computer program to measure reaction times used in the replication.
• The software used in the original experiment of the study by Morewedge et al.6,
Adobe Authorware, is no longer supported. The replication experiment was im-
plemented using z-Tree21. However, instructions and pictures used in the original
study were made available by the original authors and the final software used in the
replication experiment was approved by the original authors.
• The original study by Nishi et al.16 was conducted using a software called Breadboard,
but the version used by the original authors is no longer supported (and the original
authors did not provide the code for the version used in the original experiment).
We therefore programmed the experiment from the beginning in the most recent
version of Breadboard.
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• The original authors of Ramirez & Beilock22 did not provide the software used in
the original study, and the experiment was therefore programmed in Qualtrics based
on the materials and instructions provided by the original authors.
• For the replication of Rand et al.9, Qualtrics was used instead of LimeSurvey using
the same phrasing as in the original experiment (and this was approved by the
original authors).
• For the replication of Sparrow et al.23, the original authors did not respond to
our requests for feedback and the original materials and software used, and the
senior author passed away in 2013. We therefore programmed the software for this
replication ourselves using oTree18 based on the information provided in the original
paper and the supplementary materials. But as we received no feedback about
the design from the original authors, we could not verify that the instructions and
implementation of the experiment in the replication were identical to the original
study. After the replication had been conducted we received some feedback from
the original authors detailing the following design differences. (i) The cognitive load
manipulation differed between the original study and the replication, such that in the
original study participants were asked to remember a different six-digit number for
each word used in the modified Stroop task, whereas in the replication participants
were asked to remember the same six-digit number while completing all trials of the
modified Stroop task. (ii) The replication used 48 trials of the modified Stroop task
whereas the original study used 24 trials. (iii) The replication excluded mistakes
from the analysis (where participants click on the key for the wrong color), whereas
this was not done in the original study. However, the conclusion about the study
not replicating remains unchanged when only the first 24 trials are included in the
analysis or if mistakes are not excluded from the analysis. It also turned out that
the number of participants reported in the original paper was not correct, which
affected the power of this replication to some degree (see below). While we consider
it implausible, we cannot rule out the possibility that the difference in the cognitive
load manipulation impacted the replication result.
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Replication reports and pre-registration. The replication team responsible for each
replication wrote a replication report detailing the planned replication (with the following
sections: hypothesis to replicate and bet on; power analysis and criteria for replication:
first data collection; power analysis and criteria for replication: second data collection;
sample; materials; procedure; analysis; and differences from the original study). A draft
of each replication report was sent to the original authors for feedback, and the replica-
tion reports were revised based on the comments; this process continued until the origi-
nal authors approved the replication report (except for the Sparrow et al.23 replication,
where the original authors did not provide any feedback on the replication report and
the Ramirez & Beilock22 replication where the original authors after seeing the replica-
tion results argued that they had not approved the replication report). This version of
each replication report (the pre-replication version) was then posted at the project web-
page (www.socialsciencesreplicationproject.com) and pre-registered at the Open Science
Framework (OSF, https://osf.io/pfdyw/) prior to starting the data collection (we also
saved all communications between the original authors and the replication teams on a
dedicated e-mail account). After the replications had been conducted, the replication re-
ports were updated with the results of the replication (the following four sections were
added to the reports: results for the first data collection (90% power to detect 75% of
the original effect size); results for the first and second data collection pooled (90% power
to detect 50% of the original effect size); unplanned protocol deviations; and discussion.
The replication reports with the updated results were again sent to the original authors
for comments. After revision, the final versions of the replication reports were posted at
www.socialsciencesreplicationproject.com and at OSF (https://osf.io/pfdyw/) (the ver-
sions prior to the replications and the final versions are posted and publicly available).
In Supplementary Table 2, which lists each study, we document whether the original au-
thors of that study shared the materials of the original study and whether or not they
approved of the pre-replication version of the Replication Report with the pre-registered
design of the replication. In the table we also note if the replication used the same soft-
ware as the original study. We used the same exclusion criteria as used in the original
studies for excluding any observations in the analyses; any deviations from this are de-
tailed in the “Differences from the original study” section (if the deviation was planned
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and pre-registered) or the “Unplanned protocol deviations” section (if the deviation was
unforeseen and made after the data collection) in the replication reports. At the end of
the Supplementary Methods we list any “unplanned protocol deviations” for each of the
replications.
We invited all original authors to post a comment about the replication alongside the
replication reports at the project website and OSF. For several studies comments by the
original authors have been posted at the time of writing this SI. In these comments the
original authors have noted some perceived limitations on the replications of their studies.
Also, we received some comments in the journal peer review process. These are briefly
discussed below (the comments of the original authors of Sparrow et al.23 have also already
been discussed above).
The Duncan et al.12 study replicated in Stage 2 based on the statistical significance crite-
rion, but with a smaller effect size than observed in the original study. Here the original
authors observe that the memory accuracy was lower in the replication than in the original
study, and argues that this implies higher measurement error in the replication and that
this may have lowered the replication effect size. However, the lower memory accuracy in
the replication may be due to a lower memory ability in the replication sample, and we
cannot differentiate between these two explanations in the data. The original authors also
note that the replication results show larger treatment effects when analyzed according
to the subjective mnemonic reports (i.e. based on the subjective evaluation of whether
the preceding trial was new or old instead of the objective classification). Based on the
subjective mnemonic reports the result is already significant in Stage 1 (p = 0.035), and
the results after Stage 2 are more significant than in the main replication test based on
the objective classification (t(91) = 5.78 with the subjective classification and t(91) = 4.63
with the objective classification). The results based on the subjective classification are re-
ported in the replication report for the study and are consistent with the conclusion of the
original study replicating based on the pre-registered test for the objective classification.
Janssen et al.3 whose study replicated according to the statistical significance criterion,
but with a smaller effect size than in the original study, argues that the result tested is
not the most important statistically significant finding of their study (the result tested is
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that communication increase average earnings in a common-pool resources game). This
feedback was not communicated to us prior to conducting the replication when we made
a priori commitments to identifying the key finding. The original authors argue that the
effect of communication was of main interest to their study, but that the within-subject test
of the effect of communication was more central to their study than the between-subjects
test of communication we replicated. We originally decided to replicate the between-
subjects test rather than the within-subjects test, as the identification of the causal effect
is stronger in the between subjects test.
The original authors of Kidd & Castano24 acknowledge that our replication is a direct
replication of their study 1, with the methods closely following those of the original study.
However, they argue that the design used in their study 1 has important limitations, and
that subsequent studies have improved on the methodology through better methods of
removing individuals who did not read their assigned texts (methods of excluding individ-
uals with low reading times). They therefore argue that our replication is a relatively poor
test of the underlying hypothesis. Here we note that we followed their original procedures
closely, and the replication results fail to support the original findings and provide strong
support for the null hypothesis. We are also not convinced that removing observations
from the data is an improvement in methodology, but that intention to treat is in general
a preferred methodology for identifying causal effects (especially in this case as the reading
time may be endogenous to the treatment, causing selection bias if individuals with low
reading times are excluded).
Lee & Schwarz25 argue that an unintended methodological difference between the original
study and the replication may have affected the results of the replication. In the origi-
nal experiment, participants examined covers of 30 music albums, picked 10 they would
like to own, wrote down these 10 albums’ titles and artist names, and reported their
pre-manipulation rankings for these 10 albums in order of preference. Next, participants
worked on filler tasks while the experimenter prepared a different form by listing the 10
albums in alphabetical order of the artist names (rather than album titles). The presen-
tation order of albums did therefore differ in the pre- vs. post-manipulation evaluation
and the original authors argue that this is important for the design as they argue that
easy recall of one’s pre-manipulation evaluation may constrain one’s post-manipulation
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evaluation. In the replication, we did by mistake not follow this step during the data
collection. Instead, the presentation order of albums in the post-manipulation evaluation
was the same as in the pre-manipulation evaluation if participants copied them in that or-
der. The original authors argue that this design difference compared to the original study
may have reduced the chances of finding a significant effect of washing away postdecisional
dissonance. The original authors argue that postdecisional dissonance is a phenomenon
that involves multiple processes, and that the unintended methodological deviation in the
replication may have increased reliance on one’s memory of the earlier evaluation at the
expense of the affective processes that motivated the work of the original authors on wash-
ing away postdecisional dissonance. We do not dismiss the possibility that the protocol
deviation could have had an impact on the observed effects of dissonance reduction, but we
may find that possibility less plausible than do the original authors. We did replicate the
dissonance effect, and we did not observe any reduction of that dissonance effect whether
or not participants copied in the order of ranks or not (which we perceive as a plausible
reinforcement of memory for the original ranks). Nevertheless, we cannot conclusively
determine the reason for this, or any of the other, failures to replicate in the SSRP. As
the original authors suggest follow-up investigation is necessary to firmly determine if the
unintended protocol deviation in the replication is important or not.
The original authors of Ramirez & Beilock23 argue that we in the replication failed to
create a high-pressure performance situation because there was no significant difference
in performance between the high pressure and the low pressure condition and that we
could therefore not test whether expressive writing can boost performance under pressure.
We disagree with the interpretation of the original authors. As suggested by the original
authors we preregistered tests of manipulation checks to assess whether the pressure ma-
nipulation increased participant anxiety, and those manipulation checks were successful.
For further discussion on this we refer to the original author comment on this replica-
tion and the email correspondence between the original authors and the replication team.
These appear at https://osf.io/hps2b/ and https://osf.io/n276s/ respectively.
The original authors of Rand et al.9 raise the issue that the Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) subject pool has changed since the data collection was carried out in their study,
and in particular that the experience of economic game paradigms have increased over
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time in the AMT subject pool. Prior to conducting the replication they also asked us to
include a question about prior experience in the data collection, which we did. But they
did not ask us to pre-register any analyses or robustness test using this question. At their
advice prior experience was measured on a 5-point likert scale; with 1 (nothing similar),
3 (something similar) and 5 (exactly this scenario) marked on the scale. The distribution
of the n = 2, 136 responses on this scale was: 1 (n = 367), 2 (n = 362), 3 (n = 1, 033), 4
(n = 282), and 5 (n = 92); with a mean of 2.71. The experience level can not directly be
compared to the replicated study in Rand et al.9 as experience was not measured in that
study, and without pre-registering how to define low and high experience it is not obvious
what cut-off to use on the five-point scale. After seeing the data, the original authors
did a sub-group analysis on those with the lowest experience level (1 on the scale). They
found a similar effect size in this sub-group as for the overall sample in the original study,
but it was non-significant (p = 0.108) and therefore provides no evidence for an effect
among inexperienced subjects (the n = 367 limits the power of this test, although it is
higher than the n = 343 in the original study; as the test was not pre-registered it should
furthermore be interpreted cautiously). It cannot be ruled out that changes in the AMT
subject pool over time affects results, but we also note that the two other studies on the
public goods game based on AMT data replicated (Hauser et al.26 and Nishi et al.16).
Shah et al.27 carried out a series of five studies and we replicated study 1 based on our
criteria for replicating the first study reporting a significant treatment effect. In their
comments the original authors argue that study 1 is less important for their paper than
their other studies, and inspired by our replication they decided to carry out a replication
study of their own on all their five studies (with results posted at https:osf.io/vzm23/).
They did replicate what they consider to be their most important finding in their paper,
that scarcity itself leads to over-borrowing. But importantly they also failed to replicate
study 1 confirming our findings for that study.
Separation between prediction markets and replications. None of the researchers
involved in carrying out the replications received any information about the prediction
markets results or the survey results until all replications had been conducted. Only two
members of the research team (Thomas Pfeiffer and programmer Taizan Chan) had access
to information about the prediction market results prior to the completion of the repli-
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cations. These two people were not involved in any replication data collection. Everyone
involved in carrying out the replications was also instructed not to discuss the prediction
market with any individuals who participated in the prediction markets and surveys. This
was done to rule out the possibility that the persons conducting the experiments and
carrying out the replications were affected by the prediction market results.
Determination of replication sample sizes. We used a two-stage procedure for car-
rying out the replications. In the first data collection we had 90% power to detect 75% of
the original effect size at the 5% significance level in a two-sided test. If the original result
replicated in the first data collection (a two-sided p-value < 0.05 and an effect in the same
direction as the original study), no further data collection was carried out. If the original
result did not replicate in the first data collection, we carried out a second data collection
to have 90% power to detect 50% of the original effect size for the first and second data
collection pooled. We then tested if the original result replicated in the pooled sample (a
two-sided p-value < 0.05 and an effect in the same direction as the original study).
For the Sparrow et al.23 replication, the replication power was lower than the planned 90%
power (82.0% in the first data collection and 80.7% in the first and second data collection
pooled). This is due to an error in the reported sample size in the Sparrow et al.23 paper;
the paper reports a sample size of n = 46 but a sample size of n = 69 was actually used
(the sample size affects the power estimation as it affects the estimated standardized effect
size (r) of the original study). The original authors only provided feedback about this error
in the original paper after the replication had already been conducted.
Due to an initial mistake in analyzing the results of the first data collection in one study28,
a second data collection was carried out in spite of the fact that the first data collection
showed an effect in the same direction as the original result (and a two-sided p-value
< 0.05). An initial incorrect analysis of the data from the first data collection showed a
p-value > 0.05, and when this error was detected the second data collection was almost
completed (and we therefore decided to complete the second data collection). As the result
with all data collected is the most informative, we include the second data collection in
the Stage 2 results for this study, although, according to the initial protocol, the second
data collection should not have been carried out.
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Note that if a study fails to replicate in the first data collection, it is given a second chance
to replicate and two tests are conducted. This increases the false positive risk somewhat
compared to carrying out a single test. However, as the replication tests are directional
(i.e., the effect in the replication needs to be in the same direction as the original study)
and two-sided tests are used, the false positive risk in each test is only 2.5% (so the
total false positive risk with our two-stage procedure does still not exceed 5%; we ran a
simulation to estimate the false positive risk more exactly with our two-stage procedure
and the false positive risk is 4.2%). Related to this our power estimations, of the power
to detect 50% of the original effect size in the first and second data collection pooled, is
somewhat conservative as it does not take into account the dependency of the Stage 1 and
Stage 2 tests. We ran a simulation to estimate the power more exactly of our two-stage
testing procedure and the power to detect 50% of the original effect size is 91.1% instead
of 90%. In some replications the statistical power was slightly larger than 90% as the
total number of observations needed to be evenly divisible by some number (e.g., subjects
or groups needed to be evenly divided into treatments). In some replications the sample
sizes were also slightly larger than the planned sample size (as some original studies used
exclusion criteria and the number of exclusions were not known in advance, it was difficult
to collect exactly the planned number of observations).
The replication sample size needed was estimated in the same way for all the replications.
The standardized effect size was estimated as the correlation coefficient (r) for all the
original studies in the same way as done for the RPP7 and the EERP8; see below for more
details on this. For the first stage data collection we estimated the sample size needed
to have 90% power to detect 75% of the original effect size (expressed as the correlation
coefficient r) at the 5% level in a two-sided test; in the second stage data collection we
estimated the sample size needed to have 90% power in the pooled first and second data
collection to detect 50% of the original effect size (expressed as the correlation coefficient r)
at the 5% level in a two-sided test. Note that using some other measure of effect size such
as Cohen’s D can result in somewhat different sample sizes as the correlation coefficient
(r) and Cohen’s D are not linearly related.
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The replication power and sample sizes are substantially more ambitious than for the RPP7
and the EERP8. Those projects were based on having 90% power to detect 100% of the
original effect size, compared to having 90% power to detect 75% (the first data collection)
and 50% of the original effect size in this project (for the first and second data collection
pooled). Basing the power calculations on 75% of the original effect size rather than 100%
approximately doubles the replication sample sizes, and basing the power calculations on
50% of the original effect size rather than 100% leads to an approximate fourfold increase
in sample sizes.
The reason for increasing the power is that the RPP7 and the EERP8 have been criticized
for being underpowered as they do not take into account that original effect sizes of true
positive findings may be inflated due to publication and reporting biases. We therefore
took into account the possibility for inflated effect sizes in original studies with true positive
results in our power estimation. The reason for basing the power estimations on having
90% power to detect 50% of the original effect size was based on the replication effect sizes
in the RPP being about 50% of the original effect sizes on average7. Note, however, that
this gives an overestimation of the inflation effect as the true average inflation rate should
be estimated only for the original studies with true positive findings (but this fraction is
not exactly known). If, for instance, the rate of false positives in the RPP sample would
be 50% (such that the true effect size is zero for 50% of the studies), the RPP result
would imply zero inflation on average in original studies of true findings. As part of the
results of the SSRP we estimate the inflation rate in original effect sizes of true positive
findings. The estimated relative effect size of the 13 studies that replicated according to
the statistical significance criterion is 0.74 with a 95% confidence interval between 0.60
and 0.89. The corresponding estimate from the Bayesian mixture model is 0.71 with a
95% credible interval that ranges from 0.58 to 0.83. These results suggest that we are well
powered to detect true positive findings in the SSRP (in Stage 2 we have 90% power to
detect effect sizes below the 95% confidence intervals in the above estimations).
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Estimation of standardized effect sizes and complementary
replicability indicators
Relative effect size. Both the RPP7 and the EERP8 used the correlation coefficient (r)
as a standardized effect size measure to compare effect sizes between original studies and
replications. We used the same measure of standardized effect sizes and transformed effect
sizes into correlation coefficients (r) in the same way as done for the RPP7. The standard
errors of the correlation coefficients were calculated by applying the Fisher transformation,
and depend only on the sample size of the study. The correlation coefficient was coded as
positive for the original study regardless of the actual sign of the effect, and the replication
effect size was coded as positive if it was in the same direction as in the original study,
and negative if it was in the opposite direction. In Supplementary Figure 4, we show the
relationship between the original and replication standardized effect sizes (r).
The standardized effect sizes (r) are useful for comparing results between the original
and the replication study and to estimate a measure of the relative effect size of the
replication. However, it is less useful for comparing the level of effect sizes across studies if
the studies are based on different levels of aggregation. Some studies use observations at
the group level as the unit of observation and any aggregation reduces the variance of the
data (i.e., the variance between individuals is larger than the variance between aggregated
groups). A higher degree of aggregation of the data and thus lower variance generally
increases the standardized effect size. This is, however, not a problem for comparing
the standardized effect size between the original study and the replication, because we
carry out the statistical test in an identical way for both the original study and the
replication with the same level of aggregation. Due to the difficulties in comparing effect
sizes between original studies, we normalized the original effect sizes to 1 in our figures (i.e.,
the standardized replication effect sizes (r) as well as the upper and lower bound of the 95%
CI of r are divided by the standardized effect size (r) in the original study). However,
in Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Table 4 we also report the standardized
effect sizes (r) of the original studies and the replications without the normalization of the
original effect size to 1.
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Meta-analytic effect size. We also computed a fixed-effect weighted meta-analytic
effect size measure for each study pair as it was done both for the RPP7 and the EERP8.
The meta-analysis treats original and replicated studies equally except for the difference
in sample size and gives an estimate of the pooled effect of the original study and the
replication. The meta-analytic effect size measure is based on the assumption that there
are no publication or reporting biases in the original studies and should thus be interpreted
with great caution. The meta-analytic results are shown in Fig. 1c.
Prediction intervals. Patil, Peng and Leek29 recently proposed another method to
assess replicability. They suggest to estimate a 95% prediction interval for the original
estimate and test how many of the replications fall within this prediction interval. The
method takes into account the variability in both the original study and the replication
study. For original studies with relatively high, but “significant”, p-values prediction
intervals can be expected to lead to higher replication rates than our primary replication
indicator (a significant effect in the original direction). This is because for original studies
with a p-value close to 0.05 the prediction interval will overlap with the zero effect size or
be close to a zero effect size even for large replication sample sizes (the prediction market
formula involves taking the square root of the sum of the variance of the estimated effect
size (r) in the original study and the replication study; only including the variance of the
original estimate of r leads to a lower bound of zero for the prediction interval if the p-value
of the original study is 0.05; adding also the variance of the replication result widen the
prediction interval further). For a false positive with an original p-value close to 0.05 the
likelihood of the point estimate of the replication falling within the prediction interval is
thus high as a false positive has a 50% probability of a point estimate above zero. In other
words, with p-values close to 0.05 in original research, the prediction interval approach is
a very liberal strategy for estimating replication success. However, there is also an effect
in the opposite direction for high powered replication designs. For original studies that
are highly statistically significant it is possible that a replication can show a significant
effect in the same direction as the original study, but that fall below the prediction interval
(and is thus classified as not replicating according to the prediction interval replication
indicator). The 95% prediction interval results are shown in Fig. 2a.
19
“Small Telescopes” approach. The estimated standardized effect sizes were also
used to estimate replicability using the “Small Telescopes” approach, which was recently
proposed30. In the Small Telescopes approach it is estimated whether the replication effect
size is significantly smaller (with a one-sided test at the 5% level) than a “small effect” in
the original study. A small effect is defined as the effect size the original study would have
had 33% power to detect. If the effect size in the replication is significantly smaller than
this “small effect size” it is considered a failed replication (and otherwise it is considered
a successful replication). The Small Telescopes approach recommends using a replication
sample that is always 2.5 times the original sample size, as this gives about 80% power to
reject a “small effect”30. On average, the replication sample sizes in the SSRP are larger
than the sample sizes proposed in the Small Telescopes approach, leading to higher power
on average to reject a “small effect”. The replication sample sizes in Stage 1 are on average
about 3 times as large as the original sample sizes and replication sample sizes in Stage 2
are on average about 6 times as large as the original sample sizes. With high powered
replication designs the results with the Small Telescopes approach and our primary repli-
cation indicator can be expected to start converging. The Small Telescopes indicator can
even lead to a lower replication rate as with a high powered replication it is possible to
find a significant effect in the same direction as the original study, but that is significantly
smaller than a “small effect size”. The results for the Small Telescopes approach are shown
in Fig. 2b.
Bayesian Analysis. We computed the one-sided default Bayes factors for the replica-
tions31, as the hypotheses tested in the replications are clearly one-sided. Hence we obtain
the strength of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that stipulates an effect in the direction
of the original experiment (where a default prior is assigned to the size of the effect,
that is, a folded Cauchy distribution with scale 0.707) versus the null hypothesis that
stipulates the effect to be absent. The default Bayes factor are shown in Fig. 3. Following
Marsman et al.32 the default Bayes factors in the figure are interpreted in terms of the
evidence categories proposed by Jeffreys33 (from extreme support for the null hypothesis
to extreme support for the original hypothesis).
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We furthermore computed the replication Bayes factor. The replication Bayes factor is
similar to the default Bayes factor but uses the posterior distribution of effect size from the
original experiment as the prior distribution of effect size under the alternative hypothesis
for the evaluation of the replication study34. A replication Bayes factor above one favors
the effect size observed in the original study and a replication Bayes factor below 1 favors
the null hypothesis of no effect. The replication Bayes factor are shown in Supplementary
Figure 3. The Replication Bayes factor exceeds 1, showing evidence in favor of the effect
size observed in the original study for 12 (57.1%) studies (all of whom replicated according
to our primary replication indicator). This evidence is strong to extreme for 9 (42.9%)
studies and moderate for the remaining 3 studies. The default Bayes factor is below 1 for
9 (42.9%) studies showing evidence in support of the null hypothesis of a zero effect size
over the effect size observed in the original study; this evidence is strong to extreme for 7
(33.3%) studies and moderate for 2 studies.
The replication Bayes factor yields similar results to the default Bayes factor with the
exception of one study. For the Janssen et al.3 study the Bayes factor shifts direction.
The one-sided default Bayes factor for this study shows moderate support for an effect in
the same direction as the original study, and the replication Bayes factor shows extreme
support for a zero effect size over the effect size in the original study. This is consistent
with an effect in the original direction for this replication, but with an effect size closer
to the null effect than the effect size observed in the original study. The default Bayes
factor tests the same thing as in our primary replication indicator and the test in the
replication Bayes factor is similar to the test in the prediction interval approach (the
prediction interval test if there is a significant difference between the replication effect
size and the original effect size). The Janssen et al.3 study has a significant effect in the
original direction in our primary replication test consistent with the default Bayes factor.
However, the replication result is within the 95% prediction interval, although close to the
lower bound. The prediction interval indicator and the replication Bayes factor thus reach
different conclusions. The Janssen et al.3 study is the only study using a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney test in our study. In a robustness test below we show that the prediction
interval result for this study is sensitive towards if a t-test or a Mann-Whitney test is used
as a basis of converting the original study result into a standardized effect size. With a
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t-test the prediction interval result is in line with the replication Bayes factor result.
In addition to computing Bayes factors, we also estimated a Bayesian mixture model of
the overall results35,36. The Bayesian mixture model provides an estimate of both the rate
of true positives in the sample, and the relative effect size among true positive findings.
The Bayesian mixture model assumes that each replication study originates from one of
two components. The first component is the null hypothesis, according to which the
expected effect size in a replication study is zero. The second component is the alternative
hypothesis, according to which the expected effect size in a replication study equals a
proportion of that from the original study. This is the effect size deflation factor for true
positive studies – the extent to which replication studies yield effect sizes smaller than
those obtained in the original studies for true positive studies. This estimate is important
for determining the appropriate power to use in replication studies (i.e., the power has
to take into account that effect sizes of true positive findings are likely to be inflated in
original studies). All analyses were performed on the Fisher-transformed effect sizes r.
An errors-in-variables mixture model was estimated to take into account the uncertainty
about the reported effect sizes37. The results are shown in Supplementary Figure 5. A
more detailed report about the estimation of the Bayes factors and the Bayesian mixture
models are posted at OSF (https://osf.io/pfdyw/).
Robustness Analysis. In the RPP, the meta-analysis was only carried out for the subset
of studies based on t-tests and one degree of freedom F -tests (which is identical to a t-test),
as no standard errors of the correlation coefficients were estimated for studies using other
tests7. We therefore carried out a robustness test based on t-tests of the treatment effect
for all the 21 studies. For the five original studies using a z-test statistic, we re-analyzed
the original data and the replication data with a t-test. We then based the estimated
effect sizes on the t-tests in the meta-analytic estimates, the prediction interval estimates
and the Small telescopes estimates.
Balafoutas and Sutter4 and Gneezy et al.5 used a z-test of the differences in proportions
between two treatments. The data in these studies were re-analyzed using an independent
samples t-test. This gives very similar results. For Balafoutas and Sutter4 the z-value of
the original study is 2.371 (p = 0.018) and the effect size is r = 0.278; with a t-test the
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t-value is t(70) = 2.436 (p = 0.017) and the effect size is r = 0.280. In the replication the
z-value is 2.285 (p = 0.022) and the effect size is r = 0.146; with a t-test the t-value is
t(241) = 2.300 (p = 0.022) and the effect size is r = 0.147. The relative effect size of the
replication based on the z-test is 0.527 and the relative effect size of the replication based on
the t-test is 0.524. For Gneezy et al.5 the z-value of the original study is 3.000 (p = 0.003)
and the effect size is r = 0.223; with a t-test the t-value is t(176) = 3.066 (p = 0.003) and
the effect size is r = 0.225. In the replication the z-value is 3.706 (p < 0.001) and the
effect size is r = 0182; with a t-test the t-value is t(405) = 3.761 (p < 0.001) and the effect
size is r = 0.184. The relative effect size of the replication based on the z-test is 0.818 and
the relative effect size of the replication based on the t-test is 0.816.
Derex et al.38 estimated a logistic regression with the probability of maintaining cultural
diversity as a function of group size, and the group size coefficient was evaluated with a
Wald test (equivalent to a z-test). The data in this study was re-analyzed with a linear
probability model. The z-value of the group size variable coefficient in the original study
is 4.037 (p < 0.001) and the effect size is r = 0.525; with a t-test in a linear probability
model the t-value is t(49) = 4.812 (p < 0.001) and the effect size is r = 0.566. In the
replication the z-value of the group size coefficient is 2.972 (p = 0.003) and the effect
size is r = 0.361; with a t-test in a linear probability model the t-value is t(63) = 3.625
(p < 0.001) and the effect size is r = 0.415. The relative effect size of the replication based
on the z-test is 0.687 and the relative effect size of the replication based on the t-test is
0.733.
Janssen et al.3 used a Mann-Whitney test (yielding a z-value) to compare group earnings
between two treatments and the data in this study was re-analyzed with an independent
samples t-test. The z-value of the original study is 5.761 (p < 0.001) and the effect size
is r = 0.631; with a t-test the t-value is t(61) = 15.104 (p < 0.001) and the effect size
is r = 0.888. In the replication the z-value is 2.238 (p = 0.025) and the effect size is
r = 0.344; with a t-test the t-value is t(40) = 2.413 (p = 0.020) and the effect size is
r = 0.356. The relative effect size of the replication based on the z-test is 0.545 and the
relative effect size of the replication based on the t-test is 0.401.
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Rand et al.9 estimated a Tobit model of the contribution in a public goods game as a
function of a treatment dummy variable and the data in this study was re-analyzed with
an independent samples t-test. The z-value of the treatment dummy variable coefficient
in the original study is 2.617 (p = 0.009) and the effect size is r = 0.1410; with a t-test
the t-value is t(341) = 2.446 (p = 0.015) and the effect size is r = 0.131. In Stage 1 of the
replication data collection, the z-value of the treatment dummy variable coefficient is 0.904
(p = 0.366) and the effect size is r = 0.028; with a t-test the t-value is t(1012) = 0.693
(p = 0.488) and the effect size is r = 0.022. In Stage 2 of the replication, the z-value of the
treatment dummy variable coefficient is 1.191 (p = 0.234) and the effect size is r = 0.026;
with a t-test the t-value is t(2134) = 1.006 (p = 0.315) and the effect size is r = 0.022.
The relative effect size of the replication based on the z-test is 0.183 and the relative effect
size of the replication based on the t-test is 0.166.
The results of the robustness test are shown in Supplementary Figure 1 and Supplementary
Figure 2. The results are overall very similar in the robustness test. However, in the
prediction interval approach the conclusion about replication changes for two studies; but
in different directions leaving the overall replication rate unchanged. For the Janssen et al.3
study the replication effect size based on a z-test is within the prediction interval (although
very close to the lower bound of the interval), but based on a t-test the replications
falls below the prediction interval. This is driven by the t-test being even more strongly
significant than the Mann-Whitney test for the original study. Overall there is a significant
effect in the original direction for this study, but the effect is significantly smaller than
in the original study. This is in line with Bayes factor results for this study; the default
Bayes factor showed support for the original hypothesis over the null hypothesis, and the
replication Bayes factor showed that the effect size is closer to the null effect size than the
original effect size. For the study by Rand et al.9, the replication effect size based on a
z-test does not fall within the prediction interval (although very close to the lower bound
of the interval), but based on a t-test the effect size is within the prediction interval. The
difference in results for Rand et al. is small and it is close to the border of the prediction
interval in both cases, but just outside the interval based on the z-test and just inside the
interval based on the t-test. In the robustness test, 14 effects replicate (66.7%) according
to the prediction interval approach. This is the same as for the main analysis.
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The only other change in the robustness analysis is that the Rand et al.9 study does not
replicate in the meta-analysis. This is due to a small change in the meta-analytic p-value
for this study from 0.038 to 0.066. In the robustness test of the meta-analysis 15 studies
(71.4%) have a significant effect in the same direction as the original study. However, if
the lower p-value threshold of 0.005 for statistically significant new findings suggested by
Benjamin et al.33 is applied, the conclusion for Rand et al.9 in the meta-analysis is not
affected in the robustness test and 13 studies or 61.9% still have a p-value < 0.005 in the
meta-analysis.
The mean standardized effect size (correlation coefficient, r) of the replications in the
robustness test is 0.252, compared to 0.473 in the original studies. The mean relative
effect size of the replications is 45.7%. For the 13 studies that replicated, the mean
relative effect size is 73.7%, and for the 8 studies that did not replicate, the mean relative
effect size is 0.1%. These results are almost identical to the initial results.
Implementation of prediction markets and surveys
We used both surveys and prediction markets to measure peer beliefs about replicabil-
ity. Prediction markets can be utilized as a mechanism to aggregate private information
and beliefs and have been successfully applied to make predictions in several fields39−45.
Prediction markets and surveys were used to estimate peer beliefs about replication in a
subset of the studies in the RPP46, and for the replications in the EERP8.
Treatments. We used two different treatments for eliciting peer beliefs. Participants were
randomly assigned to these two treatments after signing up to participate in the study, and
prior to filling out the survey. In both treatments we elicited beliefs with both a survey and
with prediction markets for the 21 replication studies. In Treatment 1 we elicited beliefs
about replicability in the first data collection (Stage 1). In Treatment 2 we elicited beliefs
about replication in the first data collection (Stage 1) and in the first and second data
collection pooled (Stage 2). In the prediction markets, shares could be traded whose value
was determined by the actual outcome of the replication. Using two different treatments
allowed us to implement a design that is as simple as possible (Treatment 1) and identical
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to previous prediction market settings8,46, as well as a more complex design to elicit
predictions specific to the two-stage approach used in SSRP (Treatment 2). Comparison
of the two treatments allowed us to investigate how robust forecasts from surveys and
prediction markets are.
Recruitment. We sent invitations to participate in the survey and prediction markets
to the Economic Science Association mailing list, the Society for Judgment and Decision
Making e-mail list, the OSF e-mail list and the PsychMAP Facebook group. The invitation
was also tweeted by Brian Nosek. The invitation contained a link to an online form where
participants could sign up using their email address. A PhD degree or currently being a
PhD student was a requirement for participating in the survey and prediction markets.
The invitations to participate in the survey and prediction markets were e-mailed on
October 17, 2016 and registrations closed on October 31. The survey was sent out to
those who had registered by October 31 and the deadline for completing the survey was
November 5. The prediction markets opened on November 7 and closed on November 21.
Participants. Initially, 397 individuals signed up to participate and were randomly
assigned to one of the two treatments; 128 filled in the pre-market survey in Treatment 1
and 104 filled in the pre-market survey in Treatment 2; 114 participated on the prediction
markets in Treatment 1 and 92 participated in the prediction market in Treatment 2. The
number of traders active in each of the markets ranged from 36 to 80 in Treatment 1 and
18 to 68 in Treatment 2. Of the participants 6.8% did not work in academia (but had a
PhD), 35.0% were PhD students, 35.0% were post-docs or assistant professors, 11.2% were
lecturers or associate professors, and 11.7% were full professors. The average time spent
in academia after obtaining the PhD (for the 80% who answered this question) was 6.0
years. 41.3% of the participants resided in Europe and 51.0% resided in North America.
The most common core field of research was psychology (51.5%) followed by economics
(40.3%).
Information available to participants. All participants had access to the replication
reports for each replication (the version of the replication reports before the replications
were conducted), and the references to the original papers. In the instructions to the
survey and prediction markets, participants were also informed that the statistical power
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was 90% to detect 75% of the original effect size in Stage 1, and 90% power to detect 50%
of the original effect size in Stage 2 (and that the criteria for replication was a p-value
< 0.05 in a two-sided test and an effect in the same direction as the original study). For
each replication study, participants were informed about the hypothesis to be replicated,
the p-value of the original result, and the sample size of both the original study and the
replication.
Elicitation of peer beliefs about replicability. The pre-market survey (available at
www.socialsciencesreplicationproject.com) was designed to elicit the same type of infor-
mation as the prediction markets (i.e., the beliefs about replicability). Participants in the
pre-market survey in Treatment 1 were asked to assess, for each replication study: (i) the
likelihood that the hypothesis would be replicated in Stage 1 of the data collection; (ii)
their stated expertise for the study the hypothesis was taken from. Participants in the
pre-market survey in Treatment 2 were asked to assess, for each replication study: (i)
the likelihood that the hypothesis would be replicated in Stage 1 of the data collection;
(ii) the likelihood that the hypothesis would not be replicated in Stage 1, but would be
replicated in Stage 2 with the pooled data; (iii) the likelihood that the hypothesis would
not be replicated in Stage 1 or in Stage 2; (iv) their stated expertise for the study the
hypothesis was taken from. Participants could also optionally answer a few demographic
questions. The survey questions were not incentivized.
Implementation of prediction markets. To implement the prediction markets we
used the same web-based trading platform as in the EERP8, but adjusted the software for
Treatment 2. There were two main views on the trading interface: (i) the market overview
and (ii) the trading page. The market overview showed the 21 markets alongside summary
information and a trade button for each market. The trading page was shown after clicking
the trade button; at the trading page the participant could make investment decisions and
view more detailed information about the market (see Supplementary Figure 6).
Trading and market pricing. In both treatments, the prediction markets participants
were endowed with 100 Tokens. Once the markets opened, these Tokens could be used
to trade shares in the markets. For each share held at market closing, participants re-
ceived one Token if the corresponding outcome was realized and zero otherwise. Prices
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for this type of share are typically interpreted as the predicted probability of the outcome
to occur47,48; see Sonneman et al.49 for lab evidence that averaged beliefs are close to
prediction market prices.
In Treatment 1, participants could trade shares that paid one Token if a study replicated
after Stage 1, as defined by a p-value < 0.05 in a two-sided test and an effect in the same
direction as in the original study. Participants in this treatment could short-sell, which
is equivalent to buying shares that pay one Token if the study was not replicated after
Stage 1. Prices were determined by a market maker implementing a logarithmic market
scoring rule50 for a binary outcome, with a liquidity parameter of b = 100. As in previous
studies8,46, markets in this treatment opened at a price of 0.50 Tokens per share (for
replication in Stage 1); trading is described in detail in Camerer et al.8.
In Treatment 2, participants could trade three types of shares for each study, corresponding
to replication in Stage 1 (p-value < 0.05 in a two-sided test and an effect in the same
direction as in the original study based on the data collected in Stage 1), replication
in Stage 2 (p-value < 0.05 in a double-sided test and an effect in the same direction
as in the original study based on the combined data collected in Stage 1 and 2), and
no replication. Short selling was not possible, but is not required as participants could
directly trade shares on all three outcomes. Prices were determined by a market-maker
implementing a logarithmic market scoring rule50 for three mutually exclusive outcomes.
Prices for infinitesimally small transactions of the three shares are given by e(A1+S1)/b ·Z−1,
e
(A2+S2)/b
· Z−1, and e(A3+S3)/b · Z−1, with Z = e(A1+S1)/b + e(A2+S2)/b + e(A3+S3)/b. S1, S2, and
S3 denote the market maker net sales of shares on replication at Stage 1, Stage 2, and no
replication. As in Treatment 1, we used a liquidity parameter of b = 100; and the values
for A1, A2, and A3 were chosen such that markets opened at a price of 0.50 Tokens per
share for replication in Stage 1, 0.25 Tokens per share for replication in Stage 2, and 0.25
Tokens per share for not replicating in either Stage 1 or Stage 2. These starting prices
were chosen to be analogous to the ones used in Treatment 1.
Prices for finite transactions were obtained by integrating over the price function. The
market maker ensures both that trades are always possible even when there is no other
participant with whom to trade and that participants have incentives to invest according
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to their beliefs51. In both settings, investment decisions for a market were made from the
market’s trading page. Participants could see the (approximate) price of a new share, the
number of shares they currently held, and the number of Tokens their current position
was worth if they liquidated their shares. Information about previous prices and aggregate
positions was also displayed as graphs on the trading page. To make an adjustment to their
current position, participants could choose either to increase or decrease their position by
a number of Tokens of their choice.
See Supplementary Table 6 for data about trading volume on the prediction markets.
Incentivisation. The markets were resolved after all replication experiments were com-
pleted. If a replication was successful, shares held in the corresponding market were worth
1 Token. Tokens awarded as a result of holding shares were converted to USD at a 0.5
rate. Tokens that had not been invested in a market were not converted.
Comparison of prediction market beliefs, survey beliefs, and
replication outcomes
To compare the survey results to the prediction markets results we based the pre-market
survey measure on the sample of individuals who participated on the prediction markets
(n = 114 in Treatment 1 and n = 92 in Treatment 2). Prediction market beliefs and
survey beliefs for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are shown in Supplementary Table 5. We
analyzed the results separately for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, and we focus on the
results for Treatment 2 in the main text (as this measures beliefs about replication after
Stage 2 using all the data on replication). All prediction market beliefs below refer to final
trading prices on the study level.
Treatment 1 results
Treatment 1 measures beliefs about replicability after Stage 1. Supplementary Figure 7 de-
picts the relationship between survey beliefs and prediction market beliefs from this treat-
ment and how they relate to the replication outcome. Prediction market and survey beliefs
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are strongly related and the Spearman correlation between the prediction market beliefs
(final market prices) and the survey beliefs is 0.894 (p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.752, 0.956],
n = 21). The range of predictions is 21.3% to 79.9% with a mean of 56.9% (Mdn = 62.6%)
in the prediction markets and 19.0% to 70.5% with a mean of 48.9% (Mdn = 49.6%) in the
survey. This can be compared to the observed replication rate of 57.1% after Stage 1; the
prediction market and survey beliefs do not differ significantly from the observed repli-
cation rate in Stage 1 (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 0.156, p = 0.876, n = 21, for
prediction market beliefs versus the observed replication rate and z = 0.643, p = 0.520,
n = 21, for survey beliefs versus the observed replication rate). However, the prediction
market beliefs are significantly higher than the survey beliefs (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 3.076, p = 0.002, n = 21).
To evaluate if market beliefs and survey beliefs contain useful information for predict-
ing replication outcomes, we estimated the Spearman correlation between beliefs and
replication outcomes (i.e., the binary outcome whether a replication shows a statisti-
cally significant effect in the same direction as in the original study); we estimated
these correlations both for the replication results after Stage 1 and the replication re-
sults after Stage 2 (basing the replication results on the maximum data). The Spear-
man correlation coefficient between beliefs and the replication outcome after Stage 1
is 0.509 (p = 0.019, 95% CI = [0.098, 0.771], n = 21) for market beliefs and 0.540
(p = 0.011, 95% CI = [0.142, 0.788], n = 21) for survey beliefs. The Spearman cor-
relation coefficient between beliefs and the replication outcome after Stage 2 is 0.777
(p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.520, 0.905], n = 21) for market beliefs and 0.696 (p < 0.001,
95% CI = [0.378, 0.867], n = 21) for survey beliefs. The mean absolute prediction error
(the difference between beliefs and the replication outcome after Stage 1) is 39.7 percent-
age points for the prediction market beliefs and 42.3 percentage points for the survey
beliefs, and they do not significantly differ from each other (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 1.442, p = 0.149, n = 21).
Supplementary Table 7 summarizes the Spearman correlations between prediction market
and survey beliefs and the other reproducibility indicators considered in the SSRP, and
Supplementary Figure 8a plots the relationship between beliefs and the relative effect size
of the replications after Stage 2 (i.e., basing the relative effect sizes on the maximum
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data). The Spearman correlation coefficient between the prediction market beliefs and
the relative effect size is 0.596 (p = 0.004, 95% CI = [0.221, 0.817], n = 21), and the
Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey beliefs and the relative effect size is
0.599 (p = 0.004, 95% CI = [0.225, 0.819], n = 21).
Treatment 2 results
Treatment 2 measures beliefs about replication after Stage 1, “Stage 2-Added” (the prob-
ability of not replicating in Stage 1, but replicating in Stage 2) and after Stage 2. In Fig. 4
we show the relationship between survey beliefs and prediction market beliefs after Stage 2,
and how they relate to the replication outcome. The Spearman correlation between the
prediction market beliefs and the survey beliefs about replication after Stage 1 is 0.860
(p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.681, 0.942], n = 21); the range of predictions is 14.8% to 83.4%
with a mean of 45.5% (Mdn = 46.0%) in the prediction markets and 12.9% to 54.4%
with a mean of 36.6% (Mdn = 34.1%) in the survey. The Spearman correlation between
the prediction market beliefs and the survey beliefs about “Stage 2-Added-Replication”
is 0.197 (p = 0.391, 95% CI = [−0.256, 0.580], n = 21); the range of predictions is 6.0%
to 31.3% with a mean of 17.9% (Mdn = 19.4%) in the prediction markets and 14.8% to
29.7% with a mean of 24.0% (Mdn = 24.7%) in the survey. The Spearman correlation
between the prediction market beliefs and the survey beliefs about replication after Stage 2
is 0.845 (p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.652, 0.936], n = 21). The range of predictions is 23.1%
to 95.5% with a mean of 63.4% (Mdn = 62.7%) in the prediction markets and 27.8% to
81.5% with a mean of 60.6% (Mdn = 60.3%) in the survey.
This can be compared to the observed replication rate of 57.1% after Stage 1, 4.8% in
“Stage 2-Added” (including the Ackerman et al.28 result in Stage 2, even though this study
should not have been included in Stage 2 according to the prediction market protocol;
not including the Ackerman et al.28 result in Stage 2 would increase the number by 4.8
percentage points), and 61.9% after Stage 2 (including the Ackerman et al.28 result in
Stage 2, even though this study should not have been included in Stage 2 according to the
prediction market protocol; not including the Ackerman et al.28 result in Stage 2 would
increase the replication rate by 4.8 percentage points). The test results for comparing
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survey beliefs and prediction market beliefs to the observed replication rate are: prediction
market beliefs about replication after Stage 1 versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test, z = 1.130, p = 0.259, n = 21) and survey beliefs about replication after Stage 1
versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.450, p = 0.014, n = 21); “Stage 2-
Added” prediction market beliefs versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 0.866,
p = 0.386, n = 10) and “Stage 2-Added” survey beliefs versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, z = 0.866, p = 0.386, n = 10); prediction market beliefs about replication after
Stage 2 versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, z = 0.469, p = 0.876, n = 21) and
survey beliefs about replication after Stage 2 versus observed (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 0.261, p = 0.794, n = 21).
The Spearman correlation coefficient between beliefs about replicating after Stage 1 and
the replication outcome after Stage 1 is 0.429 (p = 0.052, 95% CI = [−0.003, 0.726],
n = 21) for prediction market beliefs and 0.556 (p = 0.009, 95% CI = [0.164, 0.797],
n = 21) for survey beliefs. The mean absolute prediction error is 41.4 percentage points for
the prediction market beliefs and 44.4 percentage points for the survey beliefs (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, z = 0.643, p = 0.520, n = 21). The Spearman correlation coefficient
between beliefs of replicating after Stage 2 and the replication outcome after Stage 2 is
0.842 (p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.645, 0.934], n = 21) for prediction market beliefs and
0.761 (p = 0.001, 95% CI = [0.491, 0.898], n = 21) for survey beliefs. The mean absolute
prediction error is 0.303 for the prediction market beliefs and 0.348 for the survey beliefs
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 2.068, p = 0.039, n = 21).
We also compare the estimated beliefs of replication after Stage 1 between Treatment 1
and Treatment 2. The estimated beliefs about replication was significantly higher in
Treatment 1 for both prediction markets beliefs (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 3.667,
p < 0.001, n = 21) and survey beliefs (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 4.015, p < 0.001,
n = 21). This could be explained by the existence of a framing effect in Treatment 2; by
asking subjects about beliefs of three events for each replication they lower their estimates
of replication in Stage 1 and increases the added replication in Stage 2. However, the
Spearman correlation between Treatments 1 and 2 for beliefs of replicating after Stage 1
is high (0.895, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.755, 0.957], n = 21 for prediction market beliefs
and 0.983, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.958, 0.993], n = 21 for survey beliefs) showing a similar
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ordering of the 21 replications in the two treatments consistent with a high test-retest
reliability of both prediction market and survey beliefs. We also estimate the Spearman
correlation between beliefs about replicating after Stage 2 in Treatment 2, and beliefs
about replicating after Stage 1 in Treatment 1. These correlations are also high (0.890
(p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.743, 0.955], n = 21) for prediction market beliefs and 0.981
(p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.952, 0.992], n = 21) for survey beliefs) again supporting a high
test-retest reliability of measuring prediction market and survey beliefs.
Supplementary Table 7 summarizes the Spearman correlations between prediction mar-
ket and survey beliefs and the other reproducibility indicators considered in the SSRP;
Supplementary Figure 8b plots the relationship between beliefs and the relative effect
size of the replications. The Spearman correlation coefficient between prediction market
beliefs about replicating after Stage 2 and the relative effect size is 0.642 (p = 0.002,
95% CI = [0.290, 0.840], n = 21), and the Spearman correlation coefficient between sur-
vey beliefs about replicating after Stage 2 and the relative effect size is 0.621 (p = 0.003,
95% CI = [0.258, 0.830], n = 21).
Comparison of reproducibility indicators to experimental
economics and psychological sciences
Supplementary Figure 9 compares the results for our two main replicability indicators
(significant effect in the same direction as the original study and the relative effect size)
to the results for psychological sciences in the RPP7 and experimental economics in the
EERP8. This comparison is based on the replication results after Stage 2. The results for
the RPP study are the same ones as presented in the EERP paper8 and they were taken
from the published replication results7. The RPP did not directly report the relative effect
size of the replication, but instead used the “effect size difference” as a reproducibility
indicator. The “effect size difference” was estimated as the absolute difference in the
standardized effect size (r) between the original study and the replication study. We
prefer to use the relative effect size (the ratio between the standardized effect size (r) of
the replication and the standardized effect size (r) of the original study). The reason for
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this is the lack of comparability of the standardized effect sizes between our 21 studies as
discussed in Section 2 above. We used the same relative effect size measure for the RPP
as estimated by Camerer et al.8; they downloaded the posted effect size data from the
RPP and estimated the relative replication effect size for each study.
Results and data for the individual studies and markets
The hypotheses as described to the participants on the prediction markets in each of the
21 studies are shown in Supplementary Table 1. Supplementary Table 3 (Stage 1) and
Supplementary Table 4 (Stage 2) summarize detailed replication results for the 21 studies.
In Supplementary Table 5 we present the prediction markets beliefs and the survey beliefs
for each of the 21 studies. Additional prediction market data for both treatments are shown
in Supplementary Table 6. Supplementary Table 7 depicts a correlation matrix (Spearman
rank correlations) for the reproducibility indicators (including the prediction market and
survey beliefs in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2) and two original study characteristics (p-
value and original sample size). The correlation between the original p-value and the the
statistical significance criterion of replication is discussed in the main text. The EERP8
also found a sizable positive correlation between the original sample size and replicability,
but this was not found in the RPP7. We therefore included the original sample size
in the correlation matrix as well. As some analyses in the SSRP are performed on the
group rather than the individual level, we correlate replication success with both the
number of observations and the number of participants as two indicators for sample size.
The correlation with the statistical significance criterion are negative but not significant
(−0.292, p = 0.199, 95% CI = [−0.643, 0.160], n = 21 for the number of observations
and −0.057, p = 0.807, 95% CI = [−0.477, 0.384], n = 21 for the number of participants)
consistent with the findings from the RPP.
The number of observations and participants in each replication study are reported in
Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Table 4. In some of the replications we also
collected data about gender and age, but this was not collected in all replications (the
replication data collections were based on the data collected in the original study). Below
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we list the number of men and women and the mean age of the participants for the
replication studies where this information is available (the data is for the pooled Stage 1
and Stage 2 data for the replications that proceed to Stage 2).
• Ackerman et al.28 replication: 187 men and 408 women (4 participants refused to
provide gender information); mean age = 29.2 years.
• Aviezer et al.17 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Balafoutas and Sutter4 replication: 243 men and 243 women; no data on age col-
lected.
• Derex et al.38 replication: 482 men, mean age = 23.7 years.
• Duncan et al.12 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Gervais and Norenzayan13 replication:196 men and 332 women (3 participants re-
fused to provide gender information); mean age = 19.0 years.
• Gneezy et al.5 replication: 160 men and 267 women, mean age = 20.3 years.
• Hauser et al.26 replication: 47 men and 63 women, mean age = 36.5 years.
• Janssen et al.3 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Karpicke and Blunt19 replication: 23 men and 26 women, mean age = 19.1 years.
• Kidd and Castano24 replication: 328 men and 386 women, mean age = 35.2 years.
• Kovacs et al.20 replication: 46 men and 49 women; no data on age collected.
• Lee and Schwarz25 replication: 97 men and 166 women (23 refused to provide infor-
mation on gender); mean age = 19.0 years.
• Morewedge et al.6 replication: 36 men and 53 women, mean age = 23.0 years.
• Nishi et al.16 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Pyc and Rawson52 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Ramirez and Beilock22 replication: 42 men and 89 women, mean age = 19.2 years.
• Rand et al.9 replication: 1080 men and 1056 women, mean age = 36.8 years.
• Shah et al.27 replication: 280 men and 339 women, mean age = 36.7 years.
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• Sparrow et al.23 replication: No data on gender or age collected.
• Wilson et al.14 replication: 10 men and 29 women, mean age = 20.3 years.
Below we also list any “unplanned protocol deviations” for each of the replications (based
on this section of the “Replication Reports”). For the replications not included below, no
“unplanned protocol deviations” occurred (we do not include the somewhat larger than
planned sample sizes in some replications among the “unplanned protocol deviations”
below).
Ackerman et al.28: An error occurred during analysis of the First Data Collection
analysis (90% power to detect 75% of the original effect size), in which the preregistered
analysis script was run with most, but not all, of the participants in the sample. The
observed p-value in that analysis did not meet criteria for concluding data collection (p <
0.05). As such, we initiated the 2nd round of data collection being run (90% power to detect
50% of the original effect size). The analysis error was discovered when the 2nd round of
data was nearly complete. We decided to finish the 2nd data collection and report all
results for completeness. Additionally, the only exclusion criteria specified in the analysis
section of our pre-data collection replication report encompassed, “sitting down or resting
the clipboard on a surface.” However, to maintain the integrity of the sample following data
collection, we have employed additional criteria to exclude participants with a reported age
below 18 years, as well as participants that reported previous knowledge of the experiment
or correctly guessed the purpose of the study before or during the debriefing period. When
all participants excluded due to values below 18 for age are included, those assigned to
the heavier clipboard (n = 299) still rated the resume as similar overall compared to those
assigned to the lighter clipboard (n = 307): Heavy clipboard M = 5.84, SD = 0.85; Light
clipboard M = 5.73, SD = 0.89; t(604) = 1.4548, p = 0.146, d = 0.1182 [−0.0415, 0.2779],
r = 0.0591 [−0.0208, 0.1382].
When including all the participants who reported previous knowledge of the experiment,
those assigned to the heavier clipboard (n = 300) still rated the resume as similar moverall
compared to those assigned to the lighter clipboard (n = 305): Heavy clipboard M = 5.84,
SD = 0.85; Light clipboard M = 5.73, SD = 0.89; t(603) = 1.4893, p = 0.137, d = 0.1211
[−0.0387, 0.2809], r = 0.0605 [−0.0194, 0.1397].
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Finally, when including all the participants except those who had missing values and
those who were excluded based on the original exclusion criteria, those assigned to the
heavier clipboard (n = 303) still rated the resume as similar overall compared to those
assigned to the lighter clipboard (n = 309): Heavy clipboard M = 5.84, SD = 0.85; Light
clipboard M = 5.74, SD = 0.89; t(610) = 1.4093, p = 0.159, d = 0.1139 [−0.0450, 0.2728],
r = 0.0570 [−0.0225, 0.1366].
Derex et al.38: Due to difficulties in recruiting, the show-up fee was raised from s$5.00 to
s$10.00, and the average performance-based payment was raised from s$10.00 to s$20.00.
Hauser et al.26: In the recruitment of subjects from AMT we only recruited subjects from
the US, used HIT approval rate greater or equal to 85%, and number of HITs approved
greater than or equal to 100. These criteria were suggested by the original authors and
decided prior to starting the data collection.
Janssen et al.3: In the replication experiment, it turns out that for the NCP-C treatment
the condition switch (from NCP to C ) happened after the fourth period. Due to this
incorrect condition switching, the NCP-C treatment in the replication experiment includes
4 rounds of the NCP condition followed by 2 rounds of the C condition. This does not
affect the findings of our replication because as planned our analysis only uses data of the
first 3 rounds of the treatments and the condition switch is by design unexpected by the
participants.
Kidd and Castano24: We only used US AMT workers with a HIT approval rate of at
least 95% in line with the original study, but this was not specified in the pre-replication
version of this Replication Report. These criteria were decided upon together with the
original authors before starting the data collection.
Two unplanned exclusion criteria were added. First, we excluded everyone who had at
least one missing answer out of the 36 questions on the RMET test (31 in first data
collection, 53 in second). This is because the dependent variable RMET score can not
be constructed for a subject with one or more missing values on the RMET score. Since
the original authors had no missing values in this outcome variable, they did not have
to consider this exclusion. This exclusion criteria was decided together with the original
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authors before starting the data collection.
Second, we excluded all participants with a negative score on the author recognition test
(2 in first data collection, 6 in the second). A negative score here indicates that the
subject had more incorrect guesses of authors than correct guesses. Since the analysis
uses a square root transformation of this variable, these subjects could not be used in the
analysis. This exclusion criteria was implemented after starting the data collection, as we
had not foreseen the possibility of a negative score on the author recognition test.
Furthermore, we changed the definition of one of our exclusion criteria for our main repli-
cation result. We planned to exclude all participants with less than 30 seconds reading
time as this was suggested by the original authors. However, to apply this threshold of 30
seconds reading time the original authors also wanted us to standardize the page length
of the reading texts (which had not been done in the original study). However, we did not
standardize the page length as we in the communication with the original authors did not
understand that we should standardize the page length to apply the 30 seconds reading
time threshold. After the data had been collected we therefore together with the original
authors decided not to exclude participants with less than 30 seconds reading time, but to
exclude participants with 0 reading time. Note that this implies that this exclusion criteria
is now the same as in the original study (as the original study excluded participants with
0 reading time, and did not standardize the page length).
Note also that some observations where participants initiate the study are automatically
excluded as some participants did not proceed further than giving consent and some
participants did not proceed further than the instructions.
Kovacs et al.20: In the original study the tests were conducted in a 3m×3m sound-
attenuated booth using Psyscope X on an Apple PowerBook. Due to difficulties in finding
exactly the same experimental venue and materials, in the replication experiment the tests
were carried out in a 3m×4m breakout room with participants wearing a sound-attenuated
device (earmuffs with a noise reduction rating of 31 decibels) using Psyscope X on a 13-inch
Apple MacBook Air.
Lee and Schwarz25: During our correspondence with the original authors, it was indi-
cated that the original experimenter ensured that the presentation order of albums was
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different in the pre- vs. post-manipulation evaluation, which was necessary to minimize the
likelihood that participants provided their post-manipulation rankings by simply retriev-
ing their memory of pre-manipulation rankings. Specifically, in the original experiment,
participants provided their pre-manipulation rankings by writing down the album titles in
the order they wanted, and then during filler tasks, the experimenter (in a different room)
would prepare a different form by listing the albums in alphabetical order of the artist
names (rather than album titles). In effect, the presentation order of albums would differ
in the pre- vs. post-manipulation evaluation.
We noted this step in our “Procedure Script” prior to the initiation of data collection.
However, we inadvertently neglected the alphabetization step when filling in the “Sec-
ondary Album Ranking” form for participants. Instead, the presentation order was the
same as what was in the pre-manipulation evaluation.
We conducted some exploratory analysis on the possible influence of episodic memory on
the presence of the effect of post-decisional dissonance. We separated participants who
had transcribed their selected albums in ascending order by rank from those who did not.
The former would be more likely to remember their album rankings by using the rank-
ordering on the page as a cue. As such, if we remove these participants, we might observe
some evidence for a difference between the examining and hand-washing conditions for
participants that did not have this memory cue. Out of the 285 participant responses
(not including the five exclusions from the pooled study sample) for the pre-manipulation,
57.5% (n = 164) of participants transcribed their 10 selected albums in the order in which
they were ranked, ascending 1–10 directly down the form. The remaining 42.5% (n = 121)
of participants did not.
Among the 121 participants that did not list the albums in rank order, we observed a
large dissonance effect (d = 1.13) of approximately the same size as for the full sample
(d = 1.05). Participants had a lower rank difference before the choice (M = 0.39, SD =
0.93) than after the choice (M = 1.95, SD = 1.73); t(120) = 8.8162, p < 0.001, d = 1.13
[0.85, 1.40]. The focal hypothesis, however, was not supported by the data. The rank
difference between the chosen and rejected CDs did not differ between the participants
in the examining conditions (M = 1.60, SD = 1.65) and the hand-washing condition
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(M = 1.52, SD = 2.19), F (1, 119) = 0.0500, p = 0.8234. The direction of the effect,
though insignificant, was the same as the equivalent test in the original study.
Morewedge et al.6: As in the original study, observations more extreme than 2.5 stan-
dard deviations from the overall mean were dropped from the analysis. The overall mean
of consumed M&M’s was M = 10.29 grams (SD = 8.99). 6 participants consumed more
than M + 2.5SD = 32.76 grams of M&M’s and one participant did not consume any
M&M’s at all such that 7 observations were excluded from the analysis. Since no partic-
ipant refused to consume any M&M’s in the original study, the original authors did not
have to consider this exclusion. However, this exclusion criteria was decided on together
with the original authors before starting the data collection.
Nishi et al.16: In line with the original study we did not restrict the sample to only Amer-
ican Turkers, but this was not specified in the pre-replication version of the Replication
Report. We only used AMT workers with a HIT approval rate of at least 95%, but this
was not specified in the pre-replication version of this Replication Report (and it is unclear
if the original study used any restrictions on the HIT approval rate for participating in
the study).
One session was by mistake conducted with only 10 subjects. When the number of subjects
finishing the training rounds did not reach at least 13, the attempted session was supposed
to be canceled. By mistake, this was not done for one session in the visible treatment, but
rather the game was played with only 10 subjects. The mean Gini over the 10 rounds was
0.1764 in this session which is quite close to the mean of 0.1690 for all the sessions in the
visible treatment group. In spite of the inclusion of this session with only 10 subjects, the
average group size (16.5) was the same for both the visible and the invisible treatment.
We planned to carry out the statistical test of the replication result using the model
with multiway clustering on session and round as this was used to test the hypothesis in
the original study. However, as this model produced implausible standard errors in the
replication we instead used a model with only clustering on the session level as the main
replication result. This does not affect the conclusion about whether the original study
replicates.
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It was challenging to carry out this replication. The original study was programmed in a
version of the program Breadboard, which is no longer supported and the original authors
did not provide the source code for the original version of the experiment. We thus had
to program the experiment from the beginning using the new version of Breadboard. We
experienced several problems with using Breadboard, and the program did not always
function correctly. During the data collection the experimental software broke down 21
times and in these cases the session had to be restarted with new subjects.
We relied on the screenshots provided in the Supplementary Information to program the
experiment as closely as possible to the original study. But as we did not have access
to the source code of the original experiment and the original authors provided much
guidance initially but were not able to reply to all subsequent detailed queries, we had to
decide on a number of issues that were not clear from the original paper or Supplementary
Information (these issues are listed at the end of the replication report).
Pyc and Rawson52: Contrary to our initial expectations, data for this replication was
collected largely during the summer. While the original study used undergraduate partic-
ipants exclusively, this replication used undergraduate and graduate students, as recruit-
ment rates were low during the summer.
A second deviation from the protocol was the additional robustness check conducted by
analyzing the manually coded responses. We did not anticipate the issue of potential mis-
classification of successful recalls due to typos before data-collection (it was not mentioned
in the original publication).
Ramirez and Beilock22: We inadvertently oversampled high-pressure conditions and
undersampled low-pressure conditions in the second data collection – we targeted 33/cell
for each of the four conditions, and instead ended up with 25 in the low-pressure control,
27 in the low-pressure expressive writing, 45 in the high-pressure control, and 34 in the
high-pressure expressive writing conditions at the conclusion of the Spring 2017 academic
semester.
All conditions for both the first and second rounds of collection were randomly assigned
using a random number generator (found at Random.org), to generate numbers 1–4, with
each digit assigned to one of the 4 experimental conditions. This created a random im-
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balance between the two high pressure conditions over the course of the pooled first and
second round collections. Additionally, prioritization was placed on reaching the target
sample for the main high pressure conditions used in the focal analysis during the Spring
2017 collection period, which led to an imbalance in the manipulation-check low pressure
conditions. The sample that we had already collected (79 in the high-pressure conditions,
and 52 in the low-pressure conditions) gave us better than 99.9% power to detect the
original manipulation-check effect size of d = 0.99, and 79% power to detect 50% of that
effect size. Also, because we oversampled the high-pressure conditions, we had more power
to detect the focal tests than prespecified.
Rand et al.9: We only used AMT workers with a HIT approval rate of at least 95% in
line with the original study, but this was not specified in the pre-replication version of this
Replication Report. This criteria was decided upon together with the original authors
before starting the data collection.
Shah et al.27: We ran a test round with 10 observations to test that the program worked
as intended before getting some more feedback from the authors. These 10 observations
were not included in the analysis as we received new information about the MTurk recruit-
ment criteria used in the original study after collecting these observations. We updated
the HIT to only accept users from the US as was done in the original study, and we added
a requirement for a HIT success rate of at least 95% (this was decided in agreement with
the original authors).
One observation in the first data collection and 9 in the second were incomplete and could
not be used, because the program had not recorded their treatment group or subject id.
It is possible that these users never finished the task, or maybe the software did not work
properly on their platform. While we cannot link these observations to specific users, a
few users did report minor technical problems.
Wilson et al.14: Some of the participants (10/39) self-reported being non-psychology
majors, even though the recruitment details emphasized that only psychology majors were
eligible to participate in the study. Apart from that, the replication study was conducted
exactly the way outlined above, without additional deviations from protocol.
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Supplementary Tables
Supplementary Table 1. Hypotheses for the 21 replication studies.
Study Hypothesis
Ackerman et al.
(2010), Science
Participants that evaluate a resume while using a heavier clipboard will rate
the resume as better overall compared to the participants that evaluate the
resume while using a lighter clipboard. The original study used F -test for a
two condition comparison, p < 0.05. Original test statistics: Heavy Condition:
N = 26, M = 5.80, SD = 0.76; Light Condition: N = 28, M = 5.38,
SD = 0.79. F (1, 52) = 4.08, p = 0.049. If there were no covariates in the
model, we will convert the F to t for comparison with the replication tests.
Aviezer et al. (2012),
Science
The body context is diagnostic for the affective valence of the situation during
peak intensity moments (tests the hypothesis of a higher mean valence rating
of winning bodies versus losing bodies in the ’body treatment’ in Experiment 1;
within subjects variation, paired t-test, t(14) = 13.07, p < 0.0001, p. 1226 and
Fig. 1c).
Balafoutas and Sutter
(2012), Science
With preferential treatment of women – i.e., each woman’s performance is au-
tomatically increased by one unit in the competition – more women will choose
to compete (a comparison of the fraction of women who chose the tourna-
ment scheme rather than the piece rate scheme in the ’preferential treatment
one (pt1)’ versus the ’control treatment (ctr)’; χ2(1) = 5.62, p = 0.018,
p. 580). (This hypothesis was picked by lottery instead of comparing pt2 to
ctr; χ2(1) = 10.89, p = 0.001, p. 580).
Derex et al. (2013),
Nature
The probability of maintaining cultural diversity (that is, observing both tasks
in the group) increases with group size; χ2(1) = 16.3, the p-value < 0.0001
(exact 0.000054) (p. 389; measured at the group level with group sizes, 2, 4,
8, and 16).
Duncan et al. (2012),
Science
Similar objects are more accurately identified as being similar if they are pre-
ceded by new objects than if they are preceded by old objects (a comparison
of the fraction of objects rated as similar in trials where they are preceded
by new objects compared to trials where they are preceded by old objects in
Study 1b (within-subject variation), t(14) = 3.41, p = 0.0042, p. 486).
Gervais and
Norenzayan (2012),
Science
Priming analytic thinking via images of ’The Thinker’ increases religious disbe-
lief compared to viewing control images of a visually similar artwork; a t-test,
p < 0.05 using a two-tailed test. Original test statistics: N = 57 (31 in Con-
trol condition, 26 in Disbelief condition); Control belief in god (100-pt scale):
M = 61.55, SD = 35.68; Disbelief: M = 41.42, SD = 31.47; t(55) = 2.24;
p = 0.029 (reported as p = 0.03).
Gneezy et al. (2014),
Science
The likelihood of choosing a charity is higher when potential donors know
that the overhead is already paid for, than when the donors pay for overhead
themselves (a comparison of the fraction choosing to donate to ’charity: wa-
ter ’ between the ’50% overhead, covered treatment’ and the ’50% overhead
treatment’, z = 3.00, p < 0.01 (exact p = 0.0027), p. 633). (This hypothesis
was picked by lottery instead of comparing the ’no overhead treatment’ and
the ’50% overhead treatment’, z = 3.27, p < 0.01, p. 633.)
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Hauser et al. (2014),
Nature
Choosing an extraction level for all group members using median voting leads
to a higher degree of sustainability of a common pool than allowing each in-
dividual to choose their own extraction amount. That is, a comparison of the
average probability that the common pool was sustained by the first gener-
ation between the voting treatment and the unregulated treatment (in both
treatments there is an 80% probability that a new generation occurs and an
extraction threshold of 50%). To evaluate this hypothesis, a linear probability
model with a treatment dummy variable is used; see the 1st generation regres-
sion equation in Table S1; p = 1.427e−10 (reported as p < 0.001) in a t-test
(t(38) = 8.696) of the treatment dummy variable coefficient.
Janssen et al. (2010),
Science
Communication increases average earnings in a common-pool resource game
with spatial and temporal resource dynamics. A comparison of net earnings
between the NCP condition and the C condition in periods 1 to 3 showed
p-value < 0.001 with the Mann-Whitney test (z = 5.761 and p = 8.362e−9).
Karpicke and Blunt
(2011), Science
In a memory test one week after learning, Retrieval Practice leads to par-
ticipants recalling more correct information than Concept-Mapping. A t-test,
p < 0.05 using a two-tailed test, comparing the Retrieval Practice and Concept
Mapping conditions. Original test statistics: N = 40 (20 in each condition);
Mean performance= 0.67 in the Retrieval Practice condition and 0.45 in the
Concept Mapping condition. The comparison between Retrieval Practice and
Concept Mapping was reported as F (1, 38) = 21.63; p = 0.000039.
Kidd and Castano
(2013), Science
Reading literary fiction improves affective Theory of Mind (a comparison of the
mean Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) score between the literary
fiction treatment and the nonfiction treatment in experiment 1; ANOVA test,
F (1, 82) = 6.40 and p = 0.0133 (reported as p = 0.01, p. 378).
Kovacs et al. (2010),
Science
Participants automatically project agents’ beliefs and store them in a way
similar to that of their own representation about the environment. A compar-
ison of the mean reaction time between the ’P-A- treatment’ and the ’P-A+
treatment’ in Study 1 (within subject variation), shows that reaction time is
shorter in the P-A+ treatment; results show that t(23) = 2.42, p-value = 0.02
(exact p = 0.0238).
Lee and Schwarz
(2010), Science
Hand washing will significantly reduce the need to justify one’s choice by in-
creasing the perceived difference between alternatives. Specifically, the mean
difference between the rankings of the chosen and rejected albums before and
after making the choice will be greater for the soap examining condition com-
pared to the soap hand washing condition. F -test assessing the interaction
between before-after and hand-washing condition, p < 0.05. Original test
statistics: (i) Soap examining condition: Mean difference between chosen and
rejected, before making choice: M = 0.14, SD = 1.01. Mean difference be-
tween chosen and rejected, after making choice: M = 2.05, SD = 1.96. (ii)
Soap hand washing condition: Mean difference between chosen and rejected,
before making choice: M = 0.68, SD = 0.75. Mean difference between cho-
sen and rejected, after making choice: M = 1.00, SD = 1.41. Interaction
of before-after and hand-washing: F (1, 38) = 6.74, p = 0.0133 (reported as
p = 0.01).
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Morewedge et al.
(2010), Science
Repeatedly imagining eating a food subsequently reduces the actual consump-
tion of that food (a comparison of the 30-repetition treatment and the con-
trol treatment in experiment 1; independent samples t-test, t(30) = 2.78,
p = 0.0092, provided by the original authors. The analysis in the original
study pools the variance across the 30-repetition, the 3-repetition, and the con-
trol condition and reports an ANOVA result of F (1, 46) = 4.50, p = 0.0393,
p. 1531.) (This hypothesis was picked by lottery instead of comparing the
mean consumption of M&M’s between the 30-repetition treatment and the
3-repetition treatment; F (1, 46) = 5.81, p < 0.05, p. 1531).
Nishi et al. (2015),
Nature
In initially unequal situations, wealth visibility leads to greater inequality than
when wealth is invisible (a comparison of the mean Gini coefficient between
the visible and high initial inequality treatment and the invisible and high ini-
tial inequality treatment; OLS regression of the session/round Gini coefficient
as the dependent variable and multiway clustering of standard errors at the
session and round level; regression equation (5) in Table S2, p = 0.0044 of a
t-test of the treatment dummy variable coefficient, t(198) = 2.881).
Pyc and Rawson
(2010), Science
Retrieval of mediators is greater with test-restudy practice than with restudy
practice; a comparison of mean mediator retrieval between the test-restudy
and the restudy treatments within the cmr treatment, p. 335, t(34) = 2.37
and p-value = 0.02, t-value and p-value from authors). Note that a successful
retrieval in each of the final test questions is defined as correctly recalling any
of the keyword mediators that had been generated during session 1.
Ramirez and Beilock
(2011), Science
In a high-pressure in-lab math test, those writing for 10 minutes about their
deepest thoughts and feelings regarding the upcoming test improve more on
that test compared to simply sitting quietly; an F -test, p < 0.05 using a two-
tailed test. Original test statistics: N = 20 (10 in each condition); Expressive
writing Mpre = 0.86 (SD = 0.09), Mpost = 0.91 (SD = 0.05), Control Mpre =
0.82 (SD = 0.09), Mpost = 0.70 (SD = 0.11); F (1, 18) = 30.53; p = 0.00003
(reported as p < 0.01, p. S11).
Rand et al. (2012),
Nature
Priming intuition increases cooperation in a public goods game compared
to priming reflection (a comparison of the mean contribution in a public
goods game between the ’intuition-good’/’reflection-bad’ treatments and the
’intuition-bad’/’reflection-good’ treatments; a Tobit regression (with robust
standard errors) with a treatment dummy variable, regression equation (1) in
Table S11; z = 2.617, p = 0.0089 in a z-test of the treatment dummy variable
coefficient).
Shah et al. (2012),
Science
Low-wealth subjects, that are given fewer chances to win in repeated ’Wheel
of Fortune’ type word puzzle games, perform worse in a subsequent attention
task (Dots-Mixed task) than do high-wealth individuals (a comparison of the
mean performance on the Dots-Mixed task between the ’poor treatment’ and
the ’rich treatment’; ANOVA test, F (1, 54) = 4.16 and p = 0.046, p. 683).
Sparrow et al. (2011),
Science
Computer terms are more accessible than general words after answering a block
of hard trivia questions; measured as longer color-naming reaction times in a
Modified Stroop Task after priming with computer terms compared to priming
with non-computer terms (paired t-test, within subject variation; t(45) = 3.26,
p = 0.0021, study 1, p. 776, and Fig. 1).
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Wilson et al. (2014),
Science
An external activity from a list (e.g. watching television or reading a book)
for 12 minutes is rated as being more enjoyable than a 12 minute ’thinking
period’ entertaining themselves with their thoughts (a higher average self-rated
enjoyment (the mean of three nine-point scale items) in the ’external activities’
treatment than in the ’standard thought instructions’ treatment in Study 8,
t(28) = 4.83, p = 0.000044, p. 76).
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Supplementary Table 2. Information about whether the original authors shared the
materials of their study and approved the replication plan, and if the replication used the
same software as the original study.
Study
Authors Shared
Materials
Replication Used
Original Software†
Authors Approved
Replication Plan
Ackerman et al. (2010), Science ✓ ◦ ✓
Aviezer et al. (2012), Science ✓ ✗ ✓
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Derex et al. (2013), Nature ✓ ✓ ✓
Duncan et al. (2012), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Gneezy et al. (2014), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Hauser et al. (2014), Nature ✓ ✓ ✓
Janssen et al. (2010), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Karpicke and Blunt (2011), Science ✓ ✗ ✓
Kidd and Castano (2013), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Kovacs et al. (2010), Science ✓ ✗ ✓
Lee and Schwarz (2010), Science ✓ ◦ ✓
Morewedge et al. (2010), Science ✓ ✗ ✓
Nishi et al. (2015), Nature ✓ ✗ ✓
Pyc and Rawson (2010), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Ramirez and Beilock (2011), Science ✓ ✗ ✗
Rand et al. (2012), Nature ✓ ✗ ✓
Shah et al. (2012), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Sparrow et al. (2011), Science ✗ ✗ ✗∗
Wilson et al. (2014), Science ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: ✓ indicates “yes”, ✗ indicates “no”, and ◦ denotes “not applicable”.
† See section 1.2 in the Supplementary Information for details about when the original software was not used.
∗ The original authors did not respond to our requests for materials and feedback on the replication report,
prior to conducting the replication.
Supplementary Table 3. Replication results for Stage 1.
Original Study Replication Stage 1
Study
Effect
Size (r)
p-Value N ∗
Effect
Size (r)
p-Value N ∗ Rep.†
Stat.
Power‡
Relative
Effect Size§
Ackerman et al. (2010), Science 0.270 0.049 54 (54) 0.141 0.024 259 (259) yes 0.901 0.521
Aviezer et al. (2012), Science 0.961 < 0.001 15 (15) 0.829 < 0.001 14 (14) yes 0.930 0.862
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Science 0.278 0.018 72 (72) 0.146 0.022 243 (243) yes 0.898 0.527
Derex et al. (2013), Nature 0.525 < 0.001 51 (366) 0.361 0.003 65 (482) yes 0.902 0.687
Duncan et al. (2012), Science 0.674 0.004 15 (15) 0.183 0.279 36 (36) no 0.909 0.271
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), Science 0.289 0.029 57 (57) −0.055 0.416 224 (224) no 0.902 −0.190
Gneezy et al. (2014), Science 0.223 0.003 178 (178) 0.182 < 0.001 407 (407) yes 0.922 0.818
Hauser et al. (2014), Nature 0.816 < 0.001 40 (200) 0.832 < 0.001 22 (110) yes 0.919 1.020
Janssen et al. (2010), Science 0.631 < 0.001 63 (105) 0.344 0.025 42 (70) yes 0.902 0.545
Karpicke and Blunt (2011), Science 0.602 < 0.001 40 (40) 0.384 0.006 49 (49) yes 0.922 0.638
Kidd and Castano (2013), Science 0.269 0.013 86 (86) −0.066 0.273 285 (285) no 0.923 −0.244
Kovacs et al. (2010), Science 0.450 0.024 24 (24) 0.586 < 0.001 95 (95) yes 0.923 1.301
Lee and Schwarz (2010), Science 0.388 0.013 40 (40) −0.068 0.455 123 (123) no 0.904 −0.176
Morewedge et al. (2010), Science 0.453 0.009 32 (32) 0.355 < 0.001 89 (89) yes 0.904 0.783
Nishi et al. (2015), Nature 0.201 0.004 200 (366) 0.116 0.011 480 (792) yes 0.912 0.579
Pyc and Rawson (2010), Science 0.377 0.024 36 (36) 0.148 0.089 132 (132) no 0.904 0.394
Ramirez and Beilock (2011), Science 0.793 < 0.001 20 (20) −0.075 0.716 26 (52) no 0.929 −0.095
Rand et al. (2012), Nature 0.141 0.009 343 (343) 0.028 0.366 1014 (1014) no 0.920 0.202
Shah et al. (2012), Science 0.267 0.046 56 (56) −0.087 0.150 278 (278) no 0.916 −0.326
Sparrow et al. (2011), Science 0.368 0.002 69 (69) 0.110 0.265 104 (104) no 0.820 0.299
Wilson et al. (2014), Science 0.674 < 0.001 30 (30) 0.594 < 0.001 39 (39) yes 0.930 0.880
∗ Number of observations; number of individuals provided in parenthesis.
† Replicated; significant effect (p < 0.05) in the same direction as in original study.
‡ Statistical power to detect 75% of the original effect size r.
§ Relative standardized effect size.
Supplementary Table 4. Replication results for Stage 2.
Original Study Replication Stage 2
Study
Effect
Size (r)
p-Value N ∗
Effect
Size (r)
p-Value N ∗ Rep.†
Stat.
Power‡
Relative
Effect Size§
Ackerman et al. (2010), Science 0.270 0.049 54 (54) 0.063 0.125 599 (599) no 0.904 0.232
Aviezer et al. (2012), Science 0.961 < 0.001 15 (15)
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Science 0.278 0.018 72 (72)
Derex et al. (2013), Nature 0.525 < 0.001 51 (366)
Duncan et al. (2012), Science 0.674 0.004 15 (15) 0.436 < 0.001 92 (92) yes 0.906 0.648
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), Science 0.289 0.029 57 (57) −0.035 0.415 531 (531) no 0.910 −0.123
Gneezy et al. (2014), Science 0.223 0.003 178 (178)
Hauser et al. (2014), Nature 0.816 < 0.001 40 (200)
Janssen et al. (2010), Science 0.631 < 0.001 63 (105)
Karpicke and Blunt (2011), Science 0.602 < 0.001 40 (40)
Kidd and Castano (2013), Science 0.269 0.013 86 (86) −0.027 0.468 714 (714) no 0.943 −0.101
Kovacs et al. (2010), Science 0.450 0.024 24 (24)
Lee and Schwarz (2010), Science 0.388 0.013 40 (40) −0.046 0.436 286 (286) no 0.901 −0.119
Morewedge et al. (2010), Science 0.453 0.009 32 (32)
Nishi et al. (2015), Nature 0.201 0.004 200 (366)
Pyc and Rawson (2010), Science 0.377 0.024 36 (36) 0.150 0.009 306 (306) yes 0.901 0.398
Ramirez and Beilock (2011), Science 0.793 < 0.001 20 (20) −0.098 0.394 79 (131) no 0.949 −0.124
Rand et al. (2012), Nature 0.141 0.009 343 (343) 0.026 0.234 2136 (2136) no 0.901 0.183
Shah et al. (2012), Science 0.267 0.046 56 (56) −0.015 0.710 619 (619) no 0.908 −0.056
Sparrow et al. (2011), Science 0.368 0.002 69 (69) 0.050 0.449 234 (234) no 0.807 0.135
Wilson et al. (2014), Science 0.674 < 0.001 30 (30)
∗ Number of observations; number of individuals provided in parenthesis.
† Replicated; significant effect (p < 0.05) in the same direction as in original study.
‡ Statistical power to detect 50% of the original effect size r.
§ Relative standardized effect size.
Supplementary Table 5. Prediction market and survey beliefs
for the 21 replication studies in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Study
Market
Belief
s1∗
Survey
Belief
s1∗
Market
Belief
s1∗
Survey
Belief
s1∗
Market
Belief
s2†
Survey
Belief
s2†
Market
Belief
s1+s2
Survey
Belief
s1+s2
Rep.
s1
Rep.
s1+s2
Ackerman et al. (2010), Science 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.28 yes no
Aviezer et al. (2012), Science 0.66 0.50 0.49 0.43 0.31 0.25 0.80 0.68 yes
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Science 0.75 0.56 0.75 0.43 0.13 0.27 0.88 0.70 yes
Derex et al. (2013), Nature 0.63 0.65 0.51 0.50 0.14 0.27 0.65 0.77 yes
Duncan et al. (2012), Science 0.72 0.50 0.56 0.39 0.18 0.27 0.74 0.65 no yes
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), Science 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.38 0.38 no no
Gneezy et al. (2014), Science 0.78 0.71 0.83 0.54 0.10 0.26 0.94 0.80 yes
Hauser et al. (2014), Nature 0.80 0.70 0.83 0.52 0.13 0.27 0.96 0.80 yes
Janssen et al. (2010), Science 0.79 0.68 0.69 0.54 0.21 0.28 0.90 0.82 yes
Karpicke and Blunt (2011), Science 0.73 0.64 0.49 0.48 0.23 0.30 0.72 0.78 yes
Kidd and Castano (2013), Science 0.39 0.37 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.34 0.46 no no
Kovacs et al. (2010), Science 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.63 0.53 yes
Lee and Schwarz (2010), Science 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.33 0.32 no no
Morewedge et al. (2010), Science 0.50 0.41 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.59 0.55 yes
Nishi et al. (2015), Nature 0.71 0.61 0.56 0.49 0.22 0.26 0.78 0.75 yes
Pyc and Rawson (2010), Science 0.74 0.45 0.58 0.34 0.23 0.26 0.82 0.60 no yes
Ramirez and Beilock (2011), Science 0.56 0.42 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.52 0.54 no no
Rand et al. (2012), Nature 0.40 0.51 0.34 0.33 0.19 0.22 0.53 0.55 no no
Shah et al. (2012), Science 0.38 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.49 0.41 no no
Sparrow et al. (2011), Science 0.51 0.44 0.40 0.33 0.11 0.24 0.51 0.57 no no
Wilson et al. (2014), Science 0.75 0.65 0.46 0.52 0.11 0.26 0.57 0.78 yes
∗ Belief about the probability of replicating in stage 1 (90% power to detect 75% of the original effect size).
† Predicted added probability of replicating in stage 2 (90% power to detect 50% of the original effect size) compared to stage 1.
Supplementary Table 6. Additional prediction market data for the 21 replication studies.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Study
Tokens
Invested∗
Volume
(Shares)†
Trans-
actions
No. of
Traders
Tokens
Invested∗
Volume
(Shares)†
Trans-
actions
No. of
Traders
Ackerman et al. (2010), Science 9.04 17.55 244 80 14.02 14.43 137 68
Aviezer et al. (2012), Science 6.64 13.37 75 37 7.16 7.21 72 36
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Science 9.43 17.66 70 45 6.06 5.43 64 35
Derex et al. (2013), Nature 8.26 15.95 76 47 7.42 6.28 70 32
Duncan et al. (2012), Science 7.22 14.03 49 39 5.61 5.45 55 34
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), Science 8.17 15.34 186 71 8.98 8.30 106 64
Gneezy et al. (2014), Science 8.50 15.84 102 62 6.49 5.77 89 46
Hauser et al. (2014), Nature 9.54 18.18 84 56 8.67 8.34 77 37
Janssen et al. (2010), Science 8.44 15.48 55 39 4.99 4.29 47 27
Karpicke and Blunt (2011), Science 5.79 11.00 65 39 7.65 7.19 81 41
Kidd and Castano (2013), Science 6.64 12.52 162 51 7.32 7.11 109 57
Kovacs et al. (2010), Science 4.99 9.85 69 37 4.74 4.82 47 25
Lee and Schwarz (2010), Science 8.17 14.80 204 65 8.23 7.78 90 59
Morewedge et al. (2010), Science 6.20 12.37 92 57 8.23 7.83 71 40
Nishi et al. (2015), Nature 12.18 23.85 51 39 6.31 6.46 60 37
Pyc and Rawson (2010), Science 7.41 14.36 53 36 4.49 4.05 26 18
Ramirez and Beilock (2011), Science 7.05 14.37 94 53 8.63 9.03 103 52
Rand et al. (2012), Nature 6.38 12.80 79 48 7.82 8.02 139 52
Shah et al. (2012), Science 8.09 15.44 125 59 8.77 8.18 61 36
Sparrow et al. (2011), Science 7.11 14.00 71 40 6.86 6.86 72 43
Wilson et al. (2014), Science 10.63 20.50 103 66 7.01 6.64 120 53
∗ Mean number of tokens (points) invested per transaction.
† Mean number of shares bought or sold per transaction.
Supplementary Table 7. Correlation matrix for the reproducibility indicators
and the two original study characteristics. Spearman correlations (p-values).
Variable
Rep.
p < 0.05
Meta
Estimate
p < 0.05
Small
Tele-
scopes
Rep.
within
95% PI
Relative
Effect
Size
Default
Bayes
Factor
Rep.
Bayes
Factor
Market
Belief
(T1)
Market
Belief
(T2)
Survey
Belief
(T1)
Survey
Belief
(T2)
Original
p-Value
Original
No. of
Obs.
Original
No. of
Part.
Replicated p < 0.05 1.0000
(0.0000)
Meta Estimate p < 0.05 0.7126 1.0000
(0.0003) (0.0000)
Small Telescopes Approach 0.9058 0.6455 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000)
Replication within 95% PI 0.9014 0.7906 0.8165 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Relative Effect Size 0.8421 0.7385 0.8581 0.8174 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Default Bayes Factor 0.8423 0.7296 0.8266 0.8177 0.9341 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Replication Bayes Factor 0.7213 0.6284 0.7237 0.7097 0.8924 0.9054 1.0000
(0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market Beliefs (Treatment 1) 0.7773 0.6093 0.6833 0.6673 0.5961 0.5898 0.4036 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0696) (0.0000)
Market Beliefs (Treatment 2) 0.8421 0.6278 0.7310 0.7006 0.6416 0.6294 0.4855 0.8896 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0257) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Survey Beliefs (Treatment 1) 0.6963 0.6093 0.6992 0.5505 0.5987 0.5788 0.4355 0.8935 0.8169 1.0000
(0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0004) (0.0097) (0.0041) (0.0060) (0.0485) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Survey Beliefs (Treatment 2) 0.7611 0.6278 0.7469 0.6172 0.6208 0.6015 0.4225 0.9312 0.8455 0.9805 1.0000
(0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0564) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Original p-Value -0.4048 -0.3139 -0.4926 -0.2502 -0.3909 -0.4300 -0.1722 -0.6519 -0.5156 -0.7247 -0.7351 1.0000
(0.0687) (0.1659) (0.0233) (0.2739) (0.0797) (0.0517) (0.4553) (0.0014) (0.0167) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Original No. of Observations -0.2920 -0.0370 -0.2228 -0.2841 -0.3395 -0.4723 -0.3561 -0.0767 -0.0377 0.1398 0.0683 0.2237 1.0000
(0.1991) (0.8735) (0.3316) (0.2121) (0.1321) (0.0306) (0.1131) (0.7409) (0.8710) (0.5455) (0.7687) (0.3296) (0.0000)
Original No. of Participants -0.0567 0.1016 0.0080 -0.0751 -0.0877 -0.1463 -0.0843 0.1215 0.1768 0.3880 0.3035 -0.0390 0.8568 1.0000
(0.8070) (0.6611) (0.9727) (0.7462) (0.7053) (0.5269) (0.7165) (0.5997) (0.4433) (0.0822) (0.1810) (0.8667) (0.0000) (0.0000)
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Supplementary Figure 1. Replication Results after Stage 1 and Stage 2. Robustness test with all results based on t-tests or F(1, df) tests. (a) Plotted are 95%
CIs of replication effect sizes (standardized to correlation coefficients r) after Stage 1. The standardized effect sizes are normalized so that 1 equals the original effect size. There is
a significant effect in the same direction as in the original study for 12 out of 21 replications [57.1%; 95% CI = (34.1%, 80.2%)]. (B) Plotted are 95% CIs of replication effect sizes
(standardized to correlation coefficients r) after Stage 2 (replications not proceeding to Stage 2 are included with their Stage 1 results). The standardized effect sizes are normalized
so that 1 equals the original effect size. There is a significant effect in the same direction as in the original study for 13 out of 21 replications [61.9%; 95% CI = (39.3%, 84.6%)]. (C)
Meta-analytic estimates of effect sizes combining the original and replication studies. 95% CIs of standardized effect sizes (correlation coefficient r). The standardized effect sizes are
normalized so that 1 equals the original effect size. 15 out of 21 studies have a significant effect in the same direction as the original study in the meta-analysis [71.43%; 95% CI =
(50.4%, 92.5%)].
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Supplementary Figure 2. Replication results for two complementary replication indicators; 95% prediction intervals29 in panel a and the Small Telescopes
approach in panel b30. Robustness test with all results based on t-tests or F(1, df) tests. (a) Plotted are 95% prediction intervals for the standardized original effect
sizes (correlation coefficient r). The standardized effect sizes are normalized so that 1 equals the original effect size. 14 out of 21 replications [66.7%; 95% CI = (44.7%, 88.6%)]
are within the 95% prediction interval and replicate according to this indicator. (b) Plotted are 90% CIs of replication effect sizes in relation to small effect sizes as defined by the
Small Telescopes approach (the effect size the original study would have had 33% power to detect). Effect sizes are standardized to correlation coefficients r and normalized so that
1 equals the original effect size. A study is defined as failing to replicate if the 90% confidence interval is below the small effect. According to the Small Telescopes approach 12 out
of 21 [57.1%; 95% CI = (34.1%, 80.2%)] studies replicate.
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Supplementary Figure 3. Replication Bayes factors for the 21 replications34. A replication
Bayes factor above one favors the effect size observed in the original study and a replication factor below
1 favors the null hypothesis of no effect. The evidence categories proposed by Jeffreys33 are also shown in
the figure (from extreme support for the null hypothesis of no effect to extreme support for the original
study effect size).
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Supplementary Figure 4. Original study effect size versus replication effect size (correlation
coefficients r). The diagonal line represents a replication effect size equal to the original effect size
and the dotted line represents a replication effect size equal to zero. The mean standardized effect size
(correlation coefficient, r) of the replications is 0.249 (SD = 0.283), compared to 0.459 (SD = 0.229) in the
original studies. This difference is significant (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, n = 21, z = 3.667, p < 0.001).
The mean relative effect size of all the replications is 46.2% [95% CI = (27.0%, 65.5%)]; the mean relative
effect size of the replications that replicated is 74.5% [95% CI = (60.1%, 88.9%)]; and the mean relative
effect size of the replications that did not replicate is 0.3% [95% CI = (−12.4%, 13.1%)]. The Spearman
correlation between the original effect size and the replication effect size is 0.574 [p = 0.007; 95% CI =
(18.9%, 80.6%)].
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Supplementary Figure 5. Bayesian inference for the errors-in-variables mixture model35−37.
(A) Posterior distribution of the true positive rate. The posterior mean is 0.673 with a 95% credible
interval that ranges from 0.43 to 0.92. (b) Posterior distribution of the replication deflation factor, that is
the degree to which true effects are overestimated in original studies vs. replication studies. The posterior
mean is 0.708, with a 95% credible interval that ranges from 0.58 to 0.83.
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Supplementary Figure 6. Trading interface. (a) Trading interface for Treatment 1. (b) Trading
interface for Treatment 2.
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Supplementary Figure 7. Prediction market and survey beliefs. The figure shows the prediction
market beliefs and the survey beliefs of replicating after Stage 1 (from Treatment 1 for measuring beliefs).
The replication studies are ranked in terms of prediction market beliefs on the y-axis. The mean prediction
market belief for replicating after Stage 1 is 56.9% [range 21.3% to 79.9%, 95% CI = (47.8%, 65.9%)], and
the mean survey belief is 48.9% [range 19.0% to 70.5%, 95% CI = (41.9%, 55.9%)]. The prediction
market beliefs and survey beliefs are highly correlated [Spearman correlation coefficient 0.894, p < 0.001,
95% CI = (0.752, 0.956), n = 21]. Both the prediction market beliefs and the survey beliefs are also
highly correlated with a successful replication after Stage 1 [Spearman correlation coefficient for prediction
market beliefs 0.509, p = 0.019, 95% CI = (9.8%, 77.1%), n = 21; Spearman correlation coefficient for
survey beliefs 0.540, p = 0.011, 95% CI = (14.2%, 78.8%), n = 21] and a successful replication after Stage 2
[Spearman correlation coefficient for prediction market beliefs 0.777, p < 0.001, 95% CI = (52.0%, 90.5%),
n = 21; Spearman correlation coefficient for survey beliefs 0.696, p =< 0.001, 95% CI = (37.8%, 86.7%),
n = 21].
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Supplementary Figure 8. Prediction market and survey beliefs and the relative effect size.
(a) Plotted are prediction market and survey beliefs about replicating after Stage 1 from Treatment 1
and relative effect sizes of the replications (with relative effect sizes based on the maximum data after
Stage 2). Both the prediction market beliefs [Spearman correlation coefficient 0.596, p = 0.004, 95% CI
= (22.1%, 81.7%), n = 21], and the survey beliefs [Spearman correlation coefficient 0.599, p = 0.004, 95%
CI = (22.5%, 81.9%), n = 21] are positively correlated with the relative effect size of the replications. (b)
Plotted are prediction market and survey beliefs about replicating after Stage 2 from Treatment 2 and
relative effect sizes of the replications. Both the prediction market beliefs [Spearman correlation coefficient
0.642, p = 0.002, 95% CI = (29.0%, 84.0%), n = 21], and the survey beliefs [Spearman correlation
coefficient 0.621, p = 0.003, 95% CI = (25.8%, 83.0%), n = 21] are positively correlated with the relative
effect size of the replications.
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Supplementary Figure 9. A comparison of replicability indicators between the Social Sciences
Replication Project (SSRP), the Experimental Economics Replication Project (EERP)8, and
the Reproducibility Project: Psychology (RPP)7. Error bars denotes ±se.
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